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This work suggests a development of the seminal model of transition from plan to market economy by
Aghion and Blanchard (1994). We introduce an informal sector to show that its presence can generate
qualitatively diﬀerent steady states, to which the economy converges in the end of transition. Two
types of transitional dynamics are considered, and it is argued that they can help explain diﬀerences in
evolution of formal and informal output exhibited, on the one hand, by East European countries and, on
the other hand, by the former Soviet Union republics such as Russia or Ukraine.
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It is been about 15 years since Central and East European countries (CEEC) as well as the former Soviet
Union republics (FSU) embarked on a process of structural reforms to abolish the former system of central
planning and establish economies based on market principles. It already becomes popular to talk about
the end of transition (for some discussion see, e.g., Svejnar, 2002) as many CEE countries have joined the
European Union. On the theoretical front, however, the creation of a coherent model of transition is still
open to dispute.
The transition in CEE countries has led to a U-shaped response of output (Blanchard, 1997). That is, a
sharp recession, that all the countries started to experience right after the beginning of reforms, was followed
by a recovery. However, many countries — members of the Commonwealth of the Independent States (CIS,
the successor of the FSU) — are still close to the bottom of the U-curve.
It is widely held that the principal driving force of the economies, capable of pulling them out of the
downside of the U, is the private sector that emerged at the beginning of transition. Before that the private
initiative was tolerated almost exclusively in agriculture while non-agricultural self-employment was either
non-existent or conﬁned to the shadow economy (Boeri and Terrell, 2002). The idea of a buoyant private
sector proved so attractive that it was absorbed by many economists studying the transition. A lot of
theoretical work was put forward, in which transformation was modelled as a process of a more or less
gradual fade-out of the state sector and the ﬂowering of the private ﬁrms. This view had an important
implication for studies of labour markets of transition economies.
In a number of papers (Burda, 1993; Aghion and Blanchard, 1994; Rodrik, 1995; Blanchard, 1997; etc.)
processes taking place in transitional labour markets were represented as shifts of labour from the shrinking
state (traditionally called "old") sector to emerging private ﬁrms (the "new" sector). However, those shifts
were not usually seen as a direct movement of labour from one sector to the other: periods of employment
were separated by unemployment spells. In a nutshell, the simple but very appealing mechanism can be
described as follows. Workers, ﬁred from state enterprises during their restructuring, become unemployed
and start to search for a job in the growing private sector. After some time more workers are hired in private
ﬁrms than are laid oﬀ in the old sector, which leads to a decrease in unemployment.
These studies have become known as the OST (for Optimal Speed of Transition) literature, since many of
them try to ﬁgure out what speed of labour reallocation would be optimal for the economies. Usually, such
work draws upon ideas put forward by the Harris and Todaro (1970) two-sector migration model adapted
to a transitional setting.
However, quite recently attention has been drawn (Boeri, 1999, 2000a,b) to the fact that this literature
does not provide a satisfactory explanation of output trends in many transition economies nor does it explain
a number of stylised facts concerning labour markets. The ﬂowering of the informal economies (Johnson et al.,
1997; Schneider and Enste, 2000), and a decrease in participation rates have been widely observed in Eastern
Europe (Boeri et al., 1998), and, particularly, in Russia (Standing, 1998), but were ignored by the majority
of OST studies. Little attention was given to labour supply (Boeri, 1999, is among rare exceptions). On
the policy prescription front, the OST models have not gone further than pointing to the speed of scrapping
of the ineﬃcient sector, the level of unemployment beneﬁts and minimum wages, as crucial in leading to
the success in transformation. However, recent empirical investigations (Jurajda and Terrell, 2002, 2003)
ﬁnd a striking similarity in the patterns of old-to-new reallocation across countries that pursued diﬀerent
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that it appears as if the inﬂuence in macroeconomic policies was mainly manifested in the aggregate level of
unemployment and wages, but not in the composition of the new sector. Other models (such as Caballero
and Hammour,1996, 2000a,b), developing the Schumpeterian idea of "creative destruction", similar in spirit
to the OST models, but still not directly applicable to the transitional setting, are now about to be called
into play to ﬁll in the gaps left by the OST literature. In particular, it is suggested that it is the importance
of the right policy environment for promoting new start-up ﬁrms that matters after all.
In this work we argue that the critique of earlier OST models (such as, e.g., Aghion and Blanchard, 1994)
is correct only in pointing to the fact that those studies do not account for a number of labour market ﬂows
observed in reality, but still they oﬀer a general picture of transition that was hardly signiﬁcantly modiﬁed in
more recent and more elaborate work, allowing for better treatment of job-to-job movements and job search
intensity (Brixiova, 1997), productivity shocks aﬀecting the old sector (Garibaldi and Brixiova, 1998), labour
supply (Boeri, 1999), capital relocation (Castanheira and Roland, 2000), moonlighting (Bouev, 2001), etc.
However, still the substantial deﬁciency of the OST models is inability to account for the informal labour
market, the underground economy, which presence may suggest a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent dynamics of output
in transition.
Further, we contend that the rent appropriability problem, embedded in the Caballero and Hammour
(1996) set-up and crucial for policy implications underscoring the importance of creating vigorous incentives
in the expanding sector, is eﬀectively present in the seminal Aghion and Blanchard (1994) work. At the same
time, the more recent strand of the OST studies (inter alia Brixiova, 1997; Garibaldi and Brixiova, 1998;
Boeri, 1999, 2000b) misses out on this aspect because of slightly diﬀerent assumptions regarding functioning
of markets and matching between ﬁrms and workers.
The goal of this paper is to provide an example of a simple model, an extension of the work by Aghion
and Blanchard (1994), that is not only able to generate the type of dynamics suggested by the previous OST
studies, but also shows that qualitatively diﬀerent equilibria are possible for various sets of policy parameters
in the presence of the informal sector. We suggest that while a choice of the pace of transition (a principal
instrument in determining the success of transformation in preceding OST studies) is important for the total
welfare of the economy, it is the policies towards the emerging new ﬁrms and informal sector that deﬁne the
eventual outcome of transition. In particular, we stress the importance of certain labour market conditions
(such as wage mark-ups in the emerging new and informal sectors) as well as of a broader eﬀect of various
institutions on the comparative proﬁtability of new formal and informal ﬁrms. The numerical simulations
indicate that the dynamics of a sustained L-type experienced by Russia and other former USSR countries
during the 90s may be explained by the convergence to a steady state qualitatively diﬀerent from the one
likely pursued by the East European transition economies.
The work is organised as follows. The next section is devoted to the critical review of OST literature.
Section 3 presents a simple model of transition in the presence of the informal sector, derives main theoretical
results, considers numerical simulation, interpretation of dynamics and explains main ﬁndings. Section 4
concludes.
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2.1 Optimal Speed of Transition Literature
2.1.1 Theoretical Models: The Picture of Transition
The experience of Central and Eastern Europe in the early 90s was that of the output decline at the start
of the process of economic transformation, when state ineﬃcient enterprises began to restructure or close
down, unemployment grew as capital and labour were reallocated across sectors, while the new private ﬁrms
came forth. A number of scholars (to name just a few - Burda,1993; Aghion and Blanchard,1994; Rodrik,
1995; Atkeson and Kehoe, 1996; Commander and Tolstopiatenko, 1996; Gavin,1996, Ruggerone, 1996; etc.)
took up the issue of explaining the transitional output fall and unemployment theoretically and initiated a
strand of the literature later called the Optimal Speed of Transition (OST) work. The name comes after the
attempts of many authors to look into the problem of ﬁnding the speed of resource relocation that would be
socially optimal. The issue was especially relevant in the light of the ongoing debate about gradualist versus
shock therapy approaches to reforms in the region (e.g. Roland, 1996).
As Boeri (1999) argues all such OST studies can be seen as developing the ideas of Harris and Todaro
(1970) migration model in the transitional backdrop. The host of models is normally of search in the
labour market type, applying the matching function (Pissarides, 2000) and the labour market ﬂow approach
(Blanchard and Diamond, 1992). The two main exceptions, Castanheira and Roland (2000) and Castanheira
(2003), use the Ramsey growth model as a framework. All the OST models can also be split into two main
categories: partial equilibrium (Aghion and Blanchard, 1994; Ruggerone, 1996; Brixiova, 1997; Shimer, 1997;
Garibaldi and Brixiova, 1998; Boeri, 2000b, etc.) and general equilibrium models (Atkeson and Kehoe, 1996;
Castanheira and Roland, 2000; and Castanheira, 2003). The general equilibrium models as a rule devote less
attention to labour markets but provide a very good set-up for the analysis of various economy-wide policies.
The partial equilibrium models focus narrowly on labour market ﬂows and policies, but their numerical
simulations still are broadly consistent with those of the general equilibrium models and the main stylised
facts. In particular, all the models feature a declining old sector, a growing new sector, inverted U- or
L-shaped development of unemployment. Job creation comes from the new ﬁrms, while the old sector is
responsible for most of the job destruction. Reallocation of workers is driven by job destruction and creation.
At the beginning of transition job destruction dominates over job creation, but in a later stage they come
into balance (see Haltiwanger et al., 2003, for discussion of main stylised facts).
2.1.2 Speed of Transition Matters
In addition to be in seemingly good accordance with the early evidence, the OST models suggested their
own vision on the gradualism versus big bang debate. They addressed the issue by showing that too slow
or too high a speed of transition (in their context a speed of scrapping of old sector employment) can have
an adverse eﬀect on the outcome of transformation. Thus, on the one hand, Aghion and Blanchard (1994)
and Chadha and Coricelli (1994) paid close attention to explicitly introduced ﬁscal externalities. In the
economy where unemployment acts as a disciplining device (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) in lowering pressure
on wages in the emerging sector, the government may be tempted to go for excessive scaling down of old
enterprises. This, however, will lead to an increasing tax burden on new sector ﬁrms as the growing number of
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is eroding. Transition may be brought to a halt because of the adverse eﬀect of taxation. At the same time,
too slow a speed of transition can be detrimental as well: low unemployment can squeeze new sector proﬁts
by driving up wages. On the other hand, Castanheira and Roland (2000) suggested another transmission
mechanism, namely savings. For example, if the speed of transition is too high, a high unemployment rate
means lower savings, and hence investment, that eventually leads to depression of output. The optimal
speed should level oﬀ various counterbalancing eﬀects and maximise the economy’s net output (Burda, 199;
Aghion and Blanchard, 1994; Brixiova, 1997) or life-time utility of consumers (Castanheira and Roland,
2000; Castanheira, 2003). What is the optimal speed in practice? The question was left down to empirical
research.
2.1.3 Are the OST studies any good?
More recent OST studies have confronted their predecessors with the data more thoroughly and argued that
they fail to incorporate several features of the transitional labour markets that are very important in reality.
In particular, it is claimed that the incorporation of job-to-job movements and the heterogeneous labour
force (Boeri, 1999, 2000a,b) may help reﬁne the implications for the optimal speed and, in addition, explain
such stylised facts as, for example, stagnant unemployment pools or a drop in labour force participation
in East European countries. Brixiova (1997) introduces job-to-job movements and shows that the duration
of unemployment rises, while the optimal speed lowers as the jobless need to compete for new matches
with workers searching on-the-job. Boeri (1999, 2000b) goes further and points out that heterogeneous
opportunities for working in the subsistence sector may explain the drop in participation rates and the
stagnancy of non-employment pool in the presence of high non-employment beneﬁts.
Despite this success the recent OST models still turn out to be less good at explaining the behaviour
of old and new sector wages as well as the behaviour of transition probabilities out of unemployment. The
main stylised facts in this respect are that the average wages fell at the start of transition, but started to
recover soon after (Basu et al, 2000; Jurajda and Terrell, 2002), while the new/old sector wage diﬀerentials
were very signiﬁcant at the start of reforms but remarkably reduced afterwards (see, e.g. Basu et al., 2000;
Jurajda and Terrell, 2003); at the same time transition probabilities out of unemployment have decreased
over the course in transition in many countries (see a summarising table in Bouev, 2004).
Why is the recent OST literature weak on this conformity to the evidence? On the one hand, in their
work Castanheira and Roland (2000) make an impromptu simplifying assumption of free movement of labour
between sectors so that there is no intersector wage diﬀerential over the course of transition. Later Castan-
heira (2003) corroborates it by the evidence on the declining new/sector wage diﬀerentials. On the other
hand, Brixiova (1997), Garibaldi and Brixiova (1998) and Boeri (1999, 2000b) extended a one sector model
by Pissarides (2000) to depict the transition as essentially an equilibrium phenomenon in the absence of
entry barriers, when wages, as well as labour market transition probabilities, are constant throughout the
process of transformation. Still, even in this set-up, Garibaldi and Brixiova (1998) show that the average
real wages fall and then recover in the course of transition by means of introducing diﬀerent productivity
states in the old sector, each with a ﬁxed wage. As the number of jobs with diﬀerent productivity varies in
the old sector the average wage in the economy changes as well.
Another weak spot of the recent OST models, in our opinion, is that although they incorporate more
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of labour market institutions, the numerical simulations of those models still are remarkably similar to those
implied by the original. This is explained by that what is important in the end is not incorporation of
on-the-job search, etc., but the relation between the exit rate from unemployment to employment and the
wage in the new sector. This relation is essentially the same in all the models, including the most recent.
The bells and whistles of the latter are undoubtedly useful policywise but they are not changing qualitatively
the predictions of the backbone model: in transition the economy converges at a faster or lower speed to a
steady state with the dominating new sector, unemployment follows an inverted U or L-shaped (if layoﬀsi n
the new sector are allowed) trajectory, until ﬂows in and out of the pool of job-seekers are balanced. This
qualitative consistence of the OST studies with stock adjustment in CEEC is acknowledged in Boeri and
Terrell (2002).
2.1.4 Why do CEEC and the CIS diﬀer?
There is one more important question not successfully challenged by the OST literature, namely the diverging
paths of CEE and the CIS. The two regions started the transition in broadly similar initial conditions,
however, the structural change has proceeded at a faster pace in CEEC than in the CIS, the development of
the private sector and of non-agricultural self-employment has been much faster in the former than in the
latter, unemployment reached the peak much earlier in CEEC than in the CIS and is more stagnant in the
Central and Eastern Europe (Boeri and Terrell, 2002; Bouev, 2004). Over the 90s the evolution of output
and employment in the CIS has resembled more a L-shaped trend, while CEEC enjoyed U-shaped patterns
both in employment and output. Boeri and Terrell (2002) argue that there are at least two diﬀerent labour
market adjustment trajectories in the transitional arena: the one followed by CEEC experiencing signiﬁcant
employment adjustment, fast structural change, and high unemployment (most of which long term), and
the other one pursued by the FSU (except for the Baltic states) with low responsiveness of employment to
output changes, strong and persistent wage declines, slower structural change and a more gradual build-up
of unemployment, which is also characterised by a relatively large turnover rate.
A possible explanation of the diﬀerences could be in the notorious speed of transition chosen: how fast
the old sector has been scrapped. A diﬀerent pace of old sector downsizing leads the economy to diﬀerent
equilibria. From the Aghion and Blanchard (1994) work it follows that these equilibria diﬀer only in the
resulting level of unemployment and wages. Indeed this can explain why unemployment in CEEC was quicker
to reach the peak than in the CIS. However, the divide between the two regions seems to have had other
qualitative diﬀerences. Boeri and Terrell (2002) point out that Russia and Ukraine adopted much more
aggressive privatisation strategies than Poland or Slovenia and yet output and employment growth in the
former two have been inferior compared to the latter two. So, the authors conclude that the diﬀerences have
little to do with the alternative between rapid and gradual transition.
An attempt to explain the divergence in the behaviour of real wages and unemployment in CEEC and
the CIS has been made in Garibaldi and Brixiova (1998). The authors argued that diﬀerences in such
labour market institutions as minimum wages and unemployment beneﬁts should be analysed together with
diﬀerences in the labour market dynamics. Boeri and Terrell (2002) have agreed on this point and stressed
that the institutional side of the labour markets, namely the design of social beneﬁt systems, minimum wages
and adjustment of wages in general, and in the old sector in particular, at least in part explains the CEE
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the alternative between a big-bang strategy and a gradual transition process...the OST theory cannot frame
the trade-oﬀ between employment and wage adjustment in the old sector."
2.1.5 Shifting Away From the OST
It seems that what the OST models have so far excessively focused on is the policy towards the ineﬃcient old
sector (for the most recent example see Castanheira, 2003, who studies at more length subsidisation of state
ﬁrms), in particular, the speed of its closure, as well as the diﬀerence in social models adopted in diﬀerent
countries.
However, the evidence suggests that this is not enough for satisfactory explanation of diﬀerences in
experience of countries within CEE, and, in particular, between CEEC and the CIS. So, EBRD (2000)
writes that "It has become increasingly clear that the distinction between fast and slow speeds of reform
camouﬂages many important similarities and provides limited guidance on the policies that need to be taken"
(p.97). Moreover, the recent empirical evidence (Jurajda and Terrell, 2002, 2003) ﬁnds a striking similarity
in the patterns of old-to-new reallocation across two CEE countries that pursued diﬀerent approaches to the
reform of the old sector and established varied labour market institutions. They point out that it appears
as if the inﬂuence in macroeconomic policies is mainly manifested in the aggregate level of unemployment
and wages, but not in the composition of the new sector. As regards the CIS versus CEEC experience - the
low unemployment beneﬁts and minimum wages could indeed facilitate the drop in wages and support the
employment in the old sector - the argument of Garibaldi and Brixiova (1998) and Boeri and Terrell (2002),
but, at the same time, following the logic of the OST theory, while often acting as wage ﬂoors (Boeri, 2000),
they should have reduced wage pressure and increased proﬁt margins in the new sector to lead to its faster
development. However, it has never happened.
Weaknesses of the OST theory have resulted in that it has become increasingly popular to invoke other
models to expound the transition in Eastern Europe. In particular, a strand of the developing economy
literature, building upon the Schumpeterian idea of "creative destruction" (in particular, Caballero and
Hammour,1996, 2000a,b), has been called into play, although, some assumptions (e.g. proﬁt maximisation
in the ineﬃcient sector) do not make it directly applicable to the transitional setting. The literature shares
a great deal of similarities with the OST theory, but it also pays some special attention to the ineﬃciencies
in the job creation process. In particular, it stresses that if investment (in its broad sense) in the expanding
sector is speciﬁc, the generated quasi-rents may be appropriable by workers/unions/government, etc., increase
investment costs to ﬁrms and slow down the adjustment process. This takes the debate on gradualism to its
new level: it is not only the speed of destruction that matters, but boosting job creation through eliminating
ineﬃciencies which is immensely important too. Caballero and Hammour (1996) argue that policy analysis
must go beyond gradualism versus cold turkey debate, and examine the managed adjustment policies needed
in the face of unbalanced restructuring. The economy’s ills are ultimately institutional in nature. An
appropriate macroeconomic policy should create favourable climate to job creation in the expanding sectors
and support employment in the contracting sectors.
92.1.6 Speciﬁc Assumptions
This part of the argument is well understood by many scholars contributed to the development of the OST
theory. In general, many agree that the superior growth performance of new private ﬁrms in transition seems
to raise important policy questions regarding the development of an economic and legal environment which
is conducive to start-ups (Jurajda and Terrell, 2000; Haltiwanger et al., 2003). Boeri and Terrell (2002) note
that the CIS, for instance, is known for signiﬁcant entry barriers associated with maﬁa and smuggling that
slow down the take-oﬀ of the new sector. Johnson et al. (2000b) provide evidence supporting Johnson et
al. (1997) that Eastern Europe and the FSU are diverging largely because of diﬀerences in the protection
of property rights. They note that eﬀorts should be made to stabilise the country’s regulatory environment
and to develop market-supporting infrastructure. Haltiwanger et al. (2003) stress that this point ties in
with the widely held view (see e.g. EBRD, 2000) that it is the diﬀerences in legal infrastructure that mainly
explain the diverging paths of CEE and CIS transition countries.
In order to eﬀectively address this side to the transition at a theoretical level, one should scrutinise
creation of job places in the new sector. However, it is diﬃcult, if at all possible, to do with the help of
the recent OST studies because job creation is modelled there in a speciﬁc way. In particular, it is assumed
that in the absence of entry barriers, and while capital markets are perfect and workers and ﬁrms have
perfect foresight, the value of created vacancy in the new sector is constant in and out of the steady state
of a system of diﬀerential equations describing dynamics of the economy. Then, given the assumption of
constant returns in the matching function, vacancy creation always has to respond proportionally to the size
of the pool of job-seekers, as if ﬁrms were able to close or open up vacancies instantaneously, or, in other
words, enter or leave the market unimpeded. Thus, vacancy creation turns out to be a jump-variable so
that it keeps the economy on the equilibrium transition path along which the market tightness is constant,
which drastically simpliﬁes the analytical complexity of such models. Then the economy always resides in a
steady state of a system of Bellman diﬀerential equations, while the transition reallocation is essentially an
equilibrium phenomenon. Such modelling of the job creation process, while being a fair theoretical exercise,
assumes no ineﬃciencies and deﬁes analysis of many possibilities that could slow down the development of
the new sector. Not surprisingly the attention of students of transition has started to shift away from the
OST theory.
However, it turns out that the backbone model by Aghion and Blanchard (1994) still has something to
oﬀer. In contrast to more recent studies it does not assume that transition occurs in perfect circumstances,
where ﬁrms can immediately inundate the market with vacancies if need be. Instead, vacancy creation
becomes proportional to the pool of job seekers only in a steady state. Out of it the economy develops under
the speciﬁc assumption that new sector ﬁrms do not face matching problems - still a realistic hypothesis in
the presence of high transitional (often involuntary) unemployment and some entry barriers. This particular
type of matching allows the authors to simplify the algebra. In such a set-up vacancy creation becomes
more explicit, and allows closer examination. In particular, it is assumed that vacancy and, hence, job
creation is a function of proﬁts, which are not driven to nil by ﬁrms freely ﬂooding the market. Thus the
vacancy rate no longer jumps to keep the market tightness constant, so that one can address explicitly the
question of inﬂuence of various factors on the ability of existing ﬁrms in the new sector to expand. This
suggests that a parallel to Caballero and Hammour (1996, 2000a,b) approach may be drawn. In order to
facilitate solution of a system of Bellman diﬀerential equations out of steady state, Aghion and Blanchard
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considerations. However, it can readily be shown that it is also, in fact, one of the ways to represent the rent
appropriability problem in the spirit of Caballero and Hammour (1996). We shall return to this point later
in section 3.7.
2.1.7 Summary
So, where do things stand? In this section we have seen that all the OST models provide a similar picture of
transition despite a variety of their modiﬁcations put forward. On the policy front the literature emphasises
the importance of proper engineering of the job destruction in the old ineﬃcient sector, and a reasonable
choice of social support programmes (unemployment compensation and minimum wages). The job creation
part of the transition process has received little or no attention in the theory, apart from the benchmark
model. Other literature from the development economics realm was enlisted to ﬁll in this gap and to provide
a better guidance in policy-making. The major question is still to be answered is why the CEEC and CIS
experience has been so diﬀerent. Thus far, no theoretical model has been satisfactory in giving a clue.
In the next subsection we review some more stylised facts that were missed out on by the OST studies.
Then we go further to suggest our own modiﬁcation of the theory.
2.2 Expanding the seminal model
2.2.1 Facts to be explained
In his impugning the OST literature Boeri (1999, 2000a,b) points out that the drop in participation rates is
what the theory should inter alia incorporate to provide a better account of reality. Boeri and Bruno (1997),
Boeri (1999), and Bouev (2004) ﬁnd that ﬂows into inactivity are widely observed in both Eastern Europe
and the CIS and take place mainly through unemployment. This drop in formal labour market activity
is likely to be connected with a rise in the share of the informal sector (Schneider and Enste, 2000). For
instance, EBRD (2000) refers to the importance of new private sector activity in the informal economy.
The striking stylised fact is that while the informal sector was expanding in many transitional economies
in the beginning of the 90-s (e.g., see the data provided by Johnson et al., 1997; Lackó, 2000; Feige and
Urban, 2003), it has been especially notable in the FSU countries such as Russia or Ukraine. Even in such
a rapidly and successfully reformed economy as Estonian at the beginning of transition hiring and creation
disproportionately occurred for workers with informal or temporary contracts (Haltiwanger and Vodopivec,
2002). In the CIS the irregular activities are still likely to keep on mounting. EBRD (2000) reports that
employment in the CIS has a higher informal share than in CEE.
These facts suggest that ﬂows to inactivity and informal employment have been important in labour
force reallocation in transition. The way economies develop cannot be completely described by ignoring such
phenomena. The truth, however, is that these facts were passed over by the majority of the OST studies.
2.2.2 Moving to Modelling
N o ta l lt h eO S Ts t u d i e sh a v ei g n o r e dt h er o l eo ft h ei n formal sector in adjustment of transitional labour
markets. So, in their contribution to the OST thought Commander and Tolstopiatenko (1997) have modelled
the new sector as representing the informal economy. Boeri (1999, 2000b) has focused on the role of the
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look at transitions between formal and informal parts of the economy (Commander and Tolstopiatenko, 1997),
or assess the reallocation between the old and new sectors when implicit outside opportunities are present
(Boeri, 1999, 2000b). Technically their results are hardly diﬀerent from the rest of the OST literature - the
labour moves between two destinations in the presence of non-employment (either active or passive in the case
of Boeri’s models). However, in these models the presence of the informal sector in the course of transition
does not generate any adverse externalities on the rise of the new formal sector, in which development the
ultimate objective of transformation is contained. Meanwhile, Caballero and Hammour (1996) has pointed to
the existence of such externalities. In particular, they argue that many crisis situations are characterised by
quick destruction of jobs in one sector and sluggish creation of jobs in another sector, so that an employment
problem develops. Many workers who lose their jobs in the contracting sectors ﬁnd themselves either in the
overt unemployment, if some form of unemployment compensation is available, or being forced to take on
employment in the informal sector. The authors show that the presence of the informal sector can slow down
the adjustment process. This happens, for example, when its productivity rises, so that the possibility of
engaging in informal sector activity strengthens workers’ threat point in wage negotiations with the formal
expanding sector. Obviously it squeezes proﬁts and hampers job creation process, especially in the presence
of speciﬁc investment that can be held up by workers.
Keeping in mind a diﬀering experience of CEEC and the CIS as far as the development of the informal
sector is concerned, one can ask a question: Is it possible that the diverging paths of the two regions in general
are explained by such an interplay of the new formal and informal sectors in the presence of ineﬃciencies
similar in spirit to ones described by Caballero and Hammour (1996, 2000a,b) and, perhaps, some other
factors?
In the next section we oﬀer our own vision of what has been going on in CEEC and the CIS. We suggest
a very simple development of the Aghion and Blanchard (1994) model to incorporate an informal sector.
We then show that this addition generates qualitatively diﬀerent equilibria from those present in the OST
literature. In particular, the economy does not necessarily always converge to a steady state where the new
sector prevails in the end of transition. In some cases the informal sector wins. We believe that existence of
such equilibria may explain the divergence of the course of CEE and the CIS countries, such as Russia or
Ukraine, in the 90s. We illustrate how important the interplay of the formal new and informal sector can
be, and that it is the policy towards the new formal sector that matters after all for the eventual success of
transformation. A direct parallel to arguments by the Caballero and Hammour models can clearly be seen.
3 A Dynamic Model of Transition
with an Informal Sector
In this section we present an OST-type dynamic model of labour force reallocation in transition in the
presence of an underground sector.
The model suggests that depending on diﬀerent combinations of policy parameters as well as other factors
conducive to more or less eﬀective job creation in the new sector relative to the informal sector, the economy
ends up either in the steady state without the underground economy, or in the steady state where it is
present. For a range of parameter values the informal sector completely crowds out the new formal sector in
12the steady state, which thus eﬀectively implies a complete failure of transformation. Numerical simulations
of the model show that irrespective of the type of the steady state, the drop in participation rate (observed
in many transition economies over the 90s) can be an inherent part of transition.
We describe main assumptions and the idea of the model in the next subsection.
3.1 Main Assumptions
Consider an economy consisting of three sectors: two oﬃcial sectors - old and new, and one informal sector.
By the old sector we understand all those state enterprises that are not eﬃcient, possess large stocks of
obsolete capital and are expected to be liquidated during the transition. Here we do not model the restruc-
turing process of old enterprises1: we simply assume that the reforms initiated in the economy inevitably
lead to the reduction in old sector employment, happening at some rate γ, - a parameter, which can in
p r i n c i p l eb ea ﬀected by the government. Following Commander and Tolstopiatenko (1996), we assume that
these ﬁrms do not invest. This could happen because either insiders have enough power to extract all surplus
or some part of revenue is defalcated or wasted.2 Old enterprises do not hire in our economy, they just shed
labour.3 Workers in the old enterprises earn some ﬁxed wage wo in general equal to their product in the
sector.
By the new sector we understand de novo (newly established) private enterprises and successfully restruc-
tured former state enterprises that have productivity y>w o and oﬀer a ﬂexible wage. These ﬁrms invest
their proﬁts causing the economy to grow. We abstract from accumulation of physical or human capital in
this model. All investments in fact go into new job creation.
The informal sector is understood as a whole range of activities including subsistence activities, home
production (e.g. work on worker’s own land plot), informal entrepreneurship, unregistered activities of formal
ﬁrms. We will think of ﬁrms in this sector as entities essentially similar to their new sector counterparts, i.e.
having the same productivity level, y, setting a ﬂexible wage according to the same general bargaining rules,
and investing their proﬁts in job creation. The diﬀerence between the two sectors is that the government
levies taxes on the new ﬁrms, while the informal ﬁrms evade taxation. Also, as we shall see later, the ability
of government to monitor the informal economy implies a higher death rate of informal ﬁr m sa so p p o s e dt o
new ﬁrms, and, as a result, a higher turnover of labour force in the sector.
We assume that both new sector and informal ﬁrms hire from the pool of non-employed workers. Direct
shifts between employment in one sector and employment in another are excluded.4
1Aghion and Blanchard (1994) consider a variant of their model where a part of old enterprises is being restructured rather
than simply closed.
2Boeri and Terrell (2002) note that in some CEEC (e.g., Poland, Hungary and Slovenia) and in Russia the so-called worker
councils or collectives had some control over the appointment of managers, wage setting and the allocation of proﬁts, which
generally went to workers.
3Layard and Richter (1995) note, that in Russia, for example, most of the unemployed are eventually rehired in old state
enterprises rather than in the new private sector. However, according to Clarke (1999) this happens mainly due to churning
(i.e. the worker movement between exhisting workplaces, which is left out of our model), but not due to creation of new jobs.
Clearly, in exacerbating conditions of economic slump creation of new job places requires at least some degree of restructuring,
which within the limit of our model would imply that such enterprises already belong to the new sector. Generally speaking,
what essential for our analysis is not the fact of hirings (or their absence) in the old sector, but is that the size of the old sector
itself shrinks in the course of transition, thus providing labour resources for the new sector and informal economy.
4The assumption of reallocation through the unemployment pool, made also in many other OST studies, is countered by
Brixiova (1997) and Boeri (2000), who argue that the reallocation of labour in the transition between the old and new sectors
has not only been through the unemployment pool but often through a mechanism of direct job-to-job shifts.
Still, this assumption can be justiﬁed on several grounds. First and foremost, one can think of the non-employment pool in
13Workers in the economy can ﬁnd themselves in four possible states: old sector employment, new sector
employment, informal employment and non-employment. Moonlighting (i.e. simultaneous job holding in
two sectors at a time) and on-the-job search are not possible. Workers involved in informal businesses drop
out of participation in the formal part of the economy and can be considered inactive.
The transition is viewed as reallocation of labour from old sector enterprises to more eﬃcient ﬁrms in
the new sector or/and informal economy. At the beginning of transition the economy is dominated by old
sector ﬁrms. Ultimately, the basic mechanism implied by the model is as follows.
The old sector is shrinking because of job break-ups. The new sector and the informal sector both create
new vacancies and start growing. Thus, worker sg e t t i n gu n e m p l o y e di nt h eo l ds e c t o rc a nﬁnd a job either
in the new sector or in the informal economy. In the latter case they drop out of participation. While in
the new or informal sector workers can be ﬁred and become non-employed. If a worker loses her job in the
informal sector, joins the ranks of non-employed and starts searching for a new job, she eﬀectively comes
back into participation (the reallocation ﬂows and transition probabilities are shown in Fig.1).
The level of wages in the old sector is given. Firms both in the new and informal sector negotiate wages
with workers through a process of Nash bargaining. It is assumed that ﬁrms do not face matching problems,
but make some "speciﬁc" investment when they create a job. This presents an ineﬃciency, such as a rent-
appropriability problem in the spirit of Caballero and Hammour (1996), that allows workers to extract some
additional surplus from the match so that the value of being employed either in the new or informal sector
turns out to be always higher than the value of being non-employed. Thus, employment is more attractive
to workers than non-employment.
The wage rates in the new and informal sectors determine their proﬁt rates, on which basis ﬁrms in
these sectors can work out a number of job vacancies to create. The latter impacts on the exit rate from
non-employment, and drives the dynamic process which describes how the economy evolves over time.
Now we can get round to considering the model in more detail.
3.2 Workers
It is assumed that the overall number of workers (working age population) available in the economy as a
whole is constant and normalised to 1. This implies that the size of the labour force (labour supply in the
formal economy) may vary depending on the size of the informal sector.
Workers can either be employed in only one of three sectors at a time or search for jobs while non-
employed. It is assumed that if employed they never leave employment voluntarily to start looking for another
job. This assumption is implicit for old sector employment, that workers may value more than unemployment
because of some additional characteristics (e.g. non-pecuniary beneﬁts) that are not speciﬁed in the analysis
a broader sense, for example as consisting both of unemployed workers and so-called concealed unemployed. The latter group
may include workers in the old enterprises compulsorily sent on an "administrative leave" (as was all too often happening in,
e.g., Russia), employees put on short-time due to absence of work for them, workers with partial payment or even without
pay (but still preserving access to some non-wage beneﬁts), etc. (Clarke, 1999). Such workers can and do in fact often spend
their additional free time looking for other jobs in formal or informal sectors. When they ﬁnd a job and are hired - a direct
job-to-job shift is registered in reality. Within the limits of our model this is captured by the transition from non-employment
to employment. Secondly, and importantly for the purpose of our study, we have argued in the background section that while
inclusion of job-to-job transitions provides a useful set-up for analysing certain labour market policies, it still does not change
the qualitative dynamics of the system. As we concentrate our eﬀorts not on taking into account as many of labour ﬂows as
possible but rather on analysing in general the dynamics and the eventual outcome of transformation of an economy with the
informal sector, the assumption of hirings solely from non-employment holds out well. Finally, as has also been mentioned
above, ﬂows into inactivity (which also include outﬂows into the informal economy) take place mainly through unemployment.
14that follows. However, we shall see later that predilection for employment over non-employment in emerging
sectors is guaranteed by ineﬃciencies in the job creation process that feeds through into wage setting.
Workers earn a ﬁxed non-employment compensation bu
5 if they are jobless, a ﬁxed wage, wo, if they are
employed in the old sector, and ﬂexible wages wn or wi if they are in new or informal sector employment,
respectively. We make the process of wage determination more explicit in section 3.7.
3.3 The Old Sector
The wage rate in the old sector, wo, is ﬁxed and assumed exogenously given. We postulate that old ﬁrms
do not invest and do not hire, they just shed labour at exogenously given rate γ. Also old sector insiders
are presumed to have enough power to extract all the rents so that, by and large, wo represents worker’s
product in the sector.
3.4 The New Sector
Wages in the new sector are set ﬂexibly at any level below worker’s product in the sector, y. This product
is greater than its counterpart in the old sector, wo, -t h ef a c tw h i c hr e ﬂects higher productivity of new
ﬁrms compared to old enterprises. New sector proﬁts are taxed at some rate τ by the government and
the remaining proceeds are invested into job creation. In section 3.7 we discuss wage determination and
investment decisions in this sector in more detail. Finally, new sector ﬁrms are assumed to have no problem
ﬁlling a vacancy, i.e. there is no matching problem for the ﬁrms.
The Bellman equation for a worker in the new sector can be written as:




where r is the interest rate, λ - is an exogenous probability6 of job loss in the sector, Vn and Vu are the
worker values of being employed in the new sector and being non-employed. The arbitrage equation states
that the return on being employed in the new sector is equal to the utility drawn from wage wn in the new
sector less the expected loss from losing the job plus the change in the value of being employed in the new
sector over time.
We assume that λ in the equation above represents some economy-wide shock leading to job break-
ups. The magnitude of this shock may be greater than the rate of job destruction in the old sector, γ, if
government accommodates part of the eﬀect of the shock (for example, by subsidising the old sector) on old
sector enterprises. Alternatively, it may be lower than γ if government speeds up the restructuring of old
enterprises and goes on with reforms more vigorously.
Workers do not leave the new sector to become employed elsewhere because by assumption they can
either produce or search for new jobs, i.e. perform only one activity at a time.
5Although we focus in this work on unemployment corresponding to the ILO deﬁnition, for simplicity we assume that all
non-employed receive unemployment compensation from the government. In general, what is important for our further analysis
is not the existence of non-employment beneﬁts as such but the ability of the government to aﬀect the utility of non-employed
workers.
6Hereafter we deal only with ﬂow probabilities as customary in the theory of matching functions. Such probabilities can take
any value between zero and inﬁnity, as according to a Poisson process they represent an average number of workers hired or laid
oﬀ depending on the context. These probabilities do not have to be below one in the general case (for more details see, e.g.,
Saint-Paul, 1996; Pissarides, 2000). However, in our model we assumed that the labour supply in the economy is normalised to
1, so all the transition probabilities must be below 1.
153.5 The Informal Sector
Characteristics of the informal sector are very similar to those of the new sector. It is assumed that worker’s
productivity, y, is equal to her productivity in the new sector7, ﬁrms do not face matching problems, set
ﬂexible wages and invest their proﬁts (see section 3.7 for more detail). These assumptions are justiﬁed by
the fact that in reality it is often the same new sector ﬁrms that run part of their businesses underground by
hiring informally to escape taxes and high social security contributions (De Soto, 1989; Boeri and Garibaldi,
2001). Also the rich literature on the informal economy (for some discussion see Johnson et al., 2000a;
Schneider and Enste, 2000) observes that tight regulation of the formal sectors, exposure to corruption and
high barriers to entry force many entrepreneurs, who would otherwise have run their enterprises formally,
start business in the shadow.
One of the diﬀerences between informal and new sector ﬁrms in our model is that proﬁts of the former
are not taxed by the government as taxes are eﬀectively evaded in the informal sector. Another diﬀerence
is that job destruction rate, and hence, labour force turnover are higher in the informal economy (for some
corroborating evidence from developing countries see, e.g., Hoek, 2002). This can be due to monitoring or
auditing activities of such bodies as tax police. Alternatively, there may exist some sector speciﬁc risks (e.g.
exposure to criminal racket) leading to more job destruction in the absence of formal job security regulations.
Thus, the asset value of informal employment for a worker is given by




where wi is the informal wage; λ - is, as before, an economy-wide shock leading to job loss, while µ is an
idiosyncratic (sector speciﬁc) shock. Henceforth, we will assume that µ reﬂects the eﬀect of monitoring
activities carried out by the government, which, thus makes µ a possible policy parameter.
The arbitrage equation (2) states that the return on being in the informal sector is equal to the rate of
informal income plus a change in the value of informal employment over time.
We do not consider direct shifts between new and informal employment assuming that full-time engage-
ment in these ﬁrms do not leave workers enough time to perform job search (even when employment in one
of the sectors brings worker a higher value then in the other sector). Also, if one thinks of the informal sector
as representing low-tier jobs as opposed to high-tier new sector jobs, the impossibility of direct movements
into new sector employment may be explained by deterioration of human capital in the informal sector.
3.6 Non-employment
Workers are non-employed when they are not working in any of the three sectors. While being non-employed
a worker faces the following possibilities: she can ﬁnd a job either in the new or the informal sector, or she
can remain jobless.
Let assume that non-employed workers perform undirected search for jobs, i.e. the probability of moving
into the new sector is independent of the probability of moving in the informal sector. Then the value of
being non-employed is:
7We shall see later on that this is just a simplifying assumption which does not aﬀect qualitatively the conclusions of our
analysis.




where bu is non-employment income (which inter alia depends on unemployment compensation); pn is a
probability of moving into the new sector; pi is a probability of moving into informal jobs. Thus, the return
on being non-employed includes utility from non-employment beneﬁts plus the expected gain from changing
into new sector or informal employment plus the change in the value of being non-employed over time.
3.7 Wages and Job Creation in the New and Informal Sectors
Collecting together all the arbitrage equations we get the following system of Bellman equations:
rVn = wn + λ(Vu − Vn)+
∂Vn
∂t
rVi = wi +( λ + µ)(Vu − Vi)+
∂Vi
∂t





In our economy employment is assumed to be always better than non-employment. In the two emerging
sectors it is modelled by assuming that wages in both new and informal ﬁrms are continuously set so that
the value of corresponding employment is higher than the value of being non-employed. This is expressed
by the two wage mark-up conditions:
Vn − Vu = c, (5)
Vi − Vu = m, (6)
for the new and informal sector, respectively, where c and m are some constants.
One can think of a number of reasons underpinning conditions (5) and (6).
Firstly, even if ﬁrms do not face matching problems and have all the bargaining power to hold down
workers to their reservation value (i.e. Vu), they still may have to pay mark-ups over the value of non-
employment to ensure, for example, that workers do not shirk. Other similar considerations from eﬃciency
wage theories may equally be applicable here.
Secondly, the value of mark-ups, c and m, may reﬂect diﬀerences in preferences of workers over formal
and informal work. For example, c may be viewed as disutility of working hard in the new sector, while m
as disutility of working in the informal sector. This latter disutility can be derived from the value of formal
pensions that informal workers forego, or from the feeling of guilt informal workers undergo while in the
shadow sector.
Thirdly, Kehoe (1994) suggests that mark-ups similar to the ones above arise from introducing moral
hazard into the job search. He illustrates that by supposing that workers can put an unobserved eﬀort into
17searching that allows them to ﬁnd matches with positive probability as opposed to other workers who do not
put any eﬀort in and do not ﬁnd matches. Putting eﬀo r ti n t os e a r c hi sc o s t l ya n dw o r k e r sw i l ld os oi fa n d
only if the future ﬂow of consumption compensates for their actions. Thus, there must be a gap between the
expected utility of workers who ﬁnd new matches and those who do not.
Fourthly, in the spirit of Caballero and Hammour (1996) the mark-ups can reﬂect the diﬀerent degree of
appropriability of quasi-rents in the new and informal sectors. In particular, appropriability or hold-up (in
the terminology of Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999) of investment is a problem of incomplete contracts that can
aﬄict the eﬃciency of job-creating transaction between a ﬁrm and a worker. When part of the investment
is "speciﬁc" to the ﬁrm and a binding and complete contract cannot be written, the ﬁrm fails to hold sway
over the quasi-rents attributable to the investment. Then the ability of a worker to renegotiate and hold
up the investment insures that the value of employment within a sector is greater than her non-employment
utility.
Finally and somewhat related to the previous point, values of the two mark-ups may be aﬀected by the
existence of separation costs, redundancy pay, or relative bargaining power of workers and ﬁrms. Again, as
in Caballero and Hammour (1996), it is often the ability of workers to exert enough bargaining power and
renegotiate the contract that generates conditions (5) and (6). We illustrate this in more detail in Appendix
A.
The mark-up conditions imply that ∂Vn
∂t = ∂Vi
∂t = ∂Vu
∂t . Then by subtracting the third equation in (4)
from the ﬁrst and the second and using the mark-up conditions we obtain expressions for wages in the new
and informal sectors, respectively:
wn = bu +( r + λ)c + pnc + pim, (7)
wi = bu +( r + λ + µ)m + pnc + pim. (8)
Thus, the wages of a worker in the new and informal sectors depend on the level of non-employment
income (which eﬀectively provides a wage ﬂoor in our economy), job break-up rates, wage mark-ups, and
probabilities of ﬁnding a job in both considered sectors. The wages are not constants, but rather are functions
of the market tightness: job ﬁnding probabilities pn and pi are expressed as ratio of job creation rates in a
particular sector to the pool of non-employed.
The wage diﬀerential between the new and informal sector is given by8:
wn − wi =( r + λ)c − (r + λ + µ)m. (9)
3.7.2 Job creation
As we have gathered from the background section, the job creation process is a foible of the OST literature.
Here we follow the approach of Aghion and Blanchard (1994), assuming that ﬁrms in the new sector and
8If we explain the mark-ups c and m by hold-ups of ﬁrm-speciﬁc investment the resulting wage diﬀerential echoes the
Caballero and Hammour (1996), who write: "When the degree of asset speciﬁcity and appropriable quasi-rents diﬀer across
sectors - as is normally the case, for example, between the formal and informal sectors - it is very natural that wages also diﬀer
in equilibrium. Appropriability can thus very naturally account for labour market segmentation, which is preponderant feature
of labour markets in the developing world."
18the informal economy invest out of retained proﬁts.9,10 In the simple version of the model borrowing is not
possible due to underdeveloped ﬁnancial markets - in section 3.11.1 we relax this assumption. The ﬂow of
investment transfers into the job creation in the absence of capital accumulation which is left out of the
scope of this work.11
In the most general speciﬁcation we deﬁne the amount per worker of investment into new job creation by
Jn = α(τ,ζ)(y − wn) (10)
and
Ji = β (µ,F,ξ)(y − wi), (11)
depending on whether she belongs to the new or informal sector, respectively.
In the two equations above y is the product/output per worker in the sectors; wn is the wage in the
new sector; wi is the informal wage; α(·) and β (·) are two functions that capture the eﬀect on job cre-
ation/investment of various institutional factors and government policies towards either the new or the
informal sector. We assume that both α(·) and β (·) c a nt a k eo nv a l u e si nb e t w e e n0a n d1 .
In the case of the new sector, α(τ,ζ) m a yd e p e n do nt h et a xr a t el e v i e do nn e wﬁrms, τ, as well as less
tangible characteristics such as a level of corruption that makes life of formal ﬁrms more diﬃcult. We use
catch-all variable ζ to denote such factors. Ruggerone (1996) calls α the reactivity of new jobs creation to
proﬁtability. Blanchard (1997) notes that α is in fact very important for the development of transition: the
more various constraints and adjustment costs facing the new sector the lower is α. The logic here is as
follows. If an economic environment is favourable then the probable value of α is close to 1, which implies
that ﬁrms can use all their proﬁts (the output less the wage rate in our case) for investment, i.e. new job
creation. Otherwise, if the economy is highly regulated or even corrupt the proﬁts of new ﬁrms might be
taken away through excessive regulation, taxation, corruption (e.g. bribing), etc. This has been the case of
a number of transition countries, and Russia in particular (see Johnson et al., 1997). In such a situation the
value of α is much lower than 1, and opportunities for job creation are scanty.
We assume that
∂α(τ,ζ)
∂τ < 0 and
∂α(τ,ζ)
∂ζ < 0, where ζ captures other (apart from taxes) factors "un-
friendly" to new sector job creation.
In a similar vein, β (·) is the factor that deﬁnes the reactivity of informal job creation to proﬁtability. It
can depend on the level of monitoring of informal activities by the tax police, µ, the level of ﬁnes charged for
running informal businesses, F, and other factors (e.g., such as existence of criminal rackets), represented




∂F < 0, and
∂β(µ,F,ξ)
∂ξ < 0.
9The results of the survey by Bratkowski et al. (2000) show that imperfections in capital markets in Central European
economies do not seem to actually inhibit the growth of new private ﬁrms. Johnson et al. (2000b) argue that the reason
for that is existence of an alternative to external ﬁnance, namely reinvesting their own proﬁts. Lizal and Svejnar (2000) ﬁnd
that in the Czech Republic retained proﬁt is a major determinant of new investment. Their results indicate that Czech ﬁrms
cannot easily borrow investment funds externally and that net investment varies with retained proﬁts. Pissarides et al. (2003)
provide evidence that Bulgarian and Russian small and medium ﬁrms use internal ﬁnance to fund investment projects, but that
constraints on external ﬁnancing limit in important ways their obility to expand production.
10Another explanation for this speciﬁcation of job creation can be costs of adjustment (learning-by-doing, accumulation of
information, etc.).
11Capital accumulation issues are taken up in Castanheira and Roland (2000) and Castanheira (2003).
19Importantly, in our model the deﬁnition of factors α(·) and β (·) implies that the government can directly
aﬀect their level, thus impacting on the development of a particular sector. In general, at least one of the
factors α(·) and β (·) can be made endogenous to the system, or they can be linked together. We do
not develop these opportunities in this work, rather assuming that α(·) and β (·) depend on exogenous
parameters, but we touch on possible departures in section 3.11.2.
Finally, if N and I are the numbers of workers in the new and informal sectors respectively, then the
rates of job creation in the sectors will correspondingly be given by JnN and JiI.
3.7.3 Open form solutions
The rates of job creation in the new and informal ﬁrms help deﬁne the transition probabilities pn and pi
from non-employment to new sector or informal employment.
So, if Jn is the ﬂow of created vacancies per worker in the new sector, then the rate of exit from non-
employment to new sector jobs can be written as pn = JnN
U , where N is the number of new sector workers
and U is the number of non-employed.
By the same token, transition probability pi is equal to JiI
U , where I is the stock of informal workers.12
Thus, on the one hand, wages in the new (7) and informal (8) sectors depend on transition probabilities
pn and pi, which in turn depend on investment rates Jn and Ji. On the other hand, the investment rates in
the new (10) and informal (11) sector depend on wages wn and wi. The system of these four equations (7),
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(U + αcN + βmI)
¶
, (15)
where Sn =( y − bu − (r + λ)c),S i =( y − bu − (r + λ + µ)m),α≡ α(·) and β ≡ β (·) are introduced for
notational convenience.
It can be shown (henceforth see Appendix A for all technical details) that wages wn and wi are decreasing
in the level of non-employment, U, but increasing in the size of employment in the new sector, N and the
informal economy, I. At the same time both Jn and Ji are increasing in the level of non-employment, U,
and decreasing in both N and I.
12The way we have written the transition probablities with job creation rates in the numerator reﬂects our assumption of no
matching problem for ﬁrms. In more general case, if ﬁrms face a problem ﬁlling vacancies, the ﬂow of hirings does not coincide
with the number of vacancies posted. So, in that situation a matching function (of the number of vacancies and job seekers)
will be put in the numerator instead of the job creation rates.
203.8 Dynamics
Above we considered Bellman equations for individual workers and deﬁned rules for wage determination and
job creation in the new and informal sectors. Now we can derive diﬀerential equations describing development
of each sector in our model. In what follows we deﬁne by O the number of workers in the old sector, by N -
the number of workers in the new sector, by I - the number of informal workers and by U -t h en u m b e ro f
the non-employed.
At the beginning of transition the bulk of the labour force belongs to the old sector. Then this employment




The equation (16) shows that on average γO old sector workers become non-employed each period.




= pnU − λN. (17)
This equation reﬂects the fact that each period pnU workers are hired in the new sector from the non-
employed ranks, while λN new sector workers lose their jobs as a result of an economy-wide shock λ.
Similarly, the informal employment follows:
dI
dt
= piU − (λ + µ)I. (18)
Again, as in the case of the new sector a few workers are hired from the non-employment pool, piU, while
(λ + µ)I informal workers become jobless due to the economy-wide shock λ and a sector speciﬁcs h o c kµ.
Finally, the ﬂows in and out of non-employment determine its dynamics as:
dU
dt
= γO+ λN +( λ + µ)I − (pn + pi)U, (19)
where the ﬁrst two terms on the right hand side are inﬂows from the formal sectors, the third term de-
scribes inﬂows from the informal economy and the fourth term represents outﬂows to formal and informal
employment.
Combining all the dynamic equations and substituting for pn = JnN
U and pi = JiI
U we obtain the following
non-linear system describing the behaviour of the economy:
13Aghion and Blachard (1994) when considering dynamics use "change in variables" relations (i.e., e.g., ∂O
∂t = const)r a t h e r
than "rate of change" ones (i.e., e.g., ∂O
∂t /O = const), although the latter formulation is more realistic given the interpretation
of job creation through retained earnings constraint. They explain their choice by the need of better tractability of the model.
However, this in fact shapes the essence of the steady states in their model, leading to discontinuities in dynamics and making
steady state transition an inherent feature of their economy. Here we use the "rate of change" speciﬁcation which generates






=( Jn − λ)N
dI
dt
=( Ji − (λ + µ))I
dU
dt
= γO+( λ − Jn)N +( ( λ + µ) − Ji)I, (20)
where wn,w i,J n, and Ji, are determined by (12), (13), (14), (15), respectively.








U =0since O + N + I + U =1 .A s
functions on the right hand side of (20) are single-valued, continuous, and continuously diﬀerentiable in O,
N, U, I, on the domain deﬁned by O ∈ (0,1],N∈ (0,1],U∈ (0,1], and I ∈ (0,1], it can be proved (see,
e.g., Kamien and Schwartz, 2001) that this system has a unique set of continuous solutions.
3.8.1 Steady states








U =0 . There are one trivial steady state (N∗ =0 , O∗ =0 , U∗ =1 , I∗ =0 )a n dt h r e et y p e s
of non-trivial ones.
Initial conditions: whence the transition? Given the way we deﬁned job creation in the new and
informal sectors (i.e. as functions of proﬁts per worker), if the economy embarks on transition having all
the labour force concentrated in the old sector, the only possible outcome is the trivial steady state: the
new and informal sector simply cannot take oﬀ because there are no funds to invest into job creation. Also,
as expressions in (14) and (15) indicate, one of the job creation rates Jn and Ji is necessarily negative if
non-employment is nil at the start of transition. So, to ensure that the dynamic system (20) converges to one
of non-trivial steady states analysed below, we need to assume that at the beginning of transition the labour
force is distributed between all four labour market states: old, new and informal sector employment and
non-employment. This assumption would not run counter to the existing evidence from transition countries
(see, e.g., EBRD, 1999, for the share of the private sector in GDP at the beginning of transition; Feige and
Urban, 2003, provide one of the most recent estimates of unrecorded economic activity in 1989-2001; Gregory
and Collier, 1988, report on unemployment statistics for the Soviet Union14).
Thus, although we will not put the condition O(0) = 1, and N (0) = U (0) = I (0) = 0 as preceding
transition, as was customary in many previous OST models, still we shall assume that the vast majority of
the labour force was aﬃliated with the old sector, and some small fractions of workforce were involved in
the new sector and the informal economy and were non-employed. This will guarantee that the economy
escapes the trivial steady state and begins its journey to a non-trivial one.
Now we can move on to analysing the types of non-trivial steady states.
14In particular, Gregory and Collier (1988) report that, although the Soviet government claimed to have "liquidated" the
unemployment in the early 1930s, many Western observers have agreed that the Soviet labour market shared many of the
characteristics of its Western counterparts, including unemployment.
22A steady state with the new sector alone In the steady state of the ﬁrst type there exists only the
new sector. From the dynamic system (20) it immediately follows that this takes place whenever O∗ =0 ,
Jn = λ and Ji <λ+ µ, while I∗ =0 . That is, in the steady state the job creation rate in the new sector is
equal to the job destruction, while in the informal sector the job creation rate is less than the job destruction
rate λ+µ. In such a situation the informal sector is not present in the steady state, neither is the old sector.
It is straightforward to show that in this steady state the number of new sector workers is equal to
N∗ =
(αSn − λ)





(αSn − λ + λαc)
. (22)
This steady state occurs whenever the parameters of the model satisfy the condition
α>
λβ
(λ + µ)+β (Sn − Si)
. (23)
It can readily be shown that the steady state non-employment level U∗ decreases in α(·) and new sector
surplus Sn, and increases in new sector mark-up c, and job destruction rate λ; while the level of new sector
employment, N∗, increases in α(·) and Sn, and decreases in c and λ accordingly.
A steady state with the informal sector alone By analogy to the previous case, there exists a steady
state with the informal sector alone, where O∗ =0 ,J i = λ + µ and Jn <λ ,while N∗ =0 . In this situation
the new sector is not present in the steady state because the job destruction rate λ exceeds the job creation
rate in the sector. At the same time ﬂows into and out of the informal employment are balanced.
The stocks of informal workers and non-employed in this steady state are, respectively, given by:
I∗ =
(βSi − (λ + µ))




(βSi − (λ + µ)+( λ + µ)βm)
. (25)
The steady state turns out whenever
α<
λβ
(λ + µ)+β (Sn − Si)
. (26)
In this steady state the level of non-employment, U∗, decreases in β (·) and Si, and increases in the
informal mark-up m and job destruction rates λ and µ; while the level of employment in the informal
economy, I∗, increases in β (·) and Si, and decreases in m, λ and µ, accordingly.
A steady state with both sectors present Finally, the third type of steady state has both sectors
present. This happens whenever O∗ =0 ,J n = λ and Ji = λ + µ. Flows both into and out of the new and
the informal sectors are balanced given their sizes and the level of non-employment.
23As shown in Appendix A, conditions Jn = λ and Ji = λ + µ are in fact identical and this takes place
whenever the following equality holds:
α =
λβ
(λ + µ)+β (Sn − Si)
. (27)
Changes in parameters and their eﬀects on steady states The knife-edge condition (27) deﬁnes a
whole range of various combinations of values of r, c, m, λ, µ, α(·), and β (·) that produce a steady state
with various shares of both new and informal sectors (proved in Appendix A). However, in reality it is
highly unlikely that the eﬀects of a number parameters on the development of new and informal sectors are
balanced to generate the equilibrium with both sectors. Thus, in what follows we do not focus on this type
of steady state.
However, it is still interesting to examine how changes in parameters of the model impact on condition
(27), shifting the balance of forces in the economy towards one or another sector, so that the steady states
with new or informal economies result.
Reactivity coeﬃcients α(·) and β (·) Firstly, from (27) it is straightforward to see that ceteris
paribus an increase in α(·) (or, equivalently, a decrease in β (·)) would upset the balance, so that conditions
to develop successfully become more favourable to the new sector and it prevails in the end of transition, as
described in section 3.8.1 above.
Sector mark-ups Secondly, without making an additional assumption regarding the relative value of
mark-ups c and m, it can readily be seen that the right hand side of (27) is decreasing in m and increasing
in c. If we assume that initially the condition (27) maintains, an increase in m, for example, would imply a
higher burden on informal ﬁrms, so that the economy would eventually converge to the steady state where
the informal sector is not present. Similarly, the steady state with the informal economy results if c rises.
Thus, the higher is the mark-up that new/informal ﬁrms have to pay its workers over their reservation value,
the more likely that the economy ends up in the steady state with informal/new ﬁrms only.
Monitoring of the informal sector Similarly to the eﬀect of an increase in m, an increase in µ leads
to a decrease in the right hand side of (27), so that the economy is likely to end up in the steady state with
the new sector alone.
Sector surpluses While monitoring has its both direct and indirect (i.e. through sector surpluses Sn
and Si)e ﬀects on the knife-edge condition, the mark-ups act solely through the surpluses. In general, the
relative size of sector surpluses Sn and Si aﬀects the resulting steady state. As the diﬀerence Sn − Si gets
larger the economy gets more chances for the new sector to crown the end of transition. Thus, as we can see
here, our assumption about the equal productivity in the new and informal sectors, y,d o e sn o ta ﬀect the
qualitative outcome. It is not the productivity per se but the relative size of proﬁt margins that makes all
the diﬀerence.
An increase in general intensity of shocks An increase in the rate of job destruction equally
aﬀecting the new and informal sector, λ, has an ambiguous eﬀect on the right hand side of (27). However,
24in Appendix A we show that it is more likely that such an increase would hurt new sector ﬁrms more than
their informal counterparts, so that the economy is more likely to end up in the state where the informal
sector prevails.
Unemployment beneﬁts The higher is the level of unemployment beneﬁts, bu, the lower both the
surplus Sn in the new sector and the surplus Si in the informal sector. So there is no any eﬀect of the
unemployment compensation on the type of the resulting steady state. However, bu still aﬀects the level of
unemployment (and hence, new or informal employment) in the equilibrium. This last result has a predicted
eﬀect common to the models of search in the labour market.
A rate of decrease in the size of the old sector Finally, condition (27) does not depend on γ -
the rate at which the old sector is declining in our model. Hence, the choice of γ does not aﬀect the steady
state, where economy converges in the end of transition.
Destination matters: whither the transition? Having established the characteristics of the steady
states it is time to discuss some diﬀerences between our simple model and the preceding OST literature.
In the backbone model by Aghion and Blanchard (1994), as we have mentioned in the background
section, the steady states, when they exist, diﬀer only in the resulting level of unemployment and wages.
Also, because of ﬁscal externality eﬀect on job creation there may exist both stable and unstable steady
states, which however, qualitatively identical. That is, there the development of the new sector always
crowns the transition. In more recent OST work the question of multiple steady states has hardly ever
been discussed. Although, the stability issue has manifested itself in the equilibrium path along which
the transition has solely been considered. This path leading to the steady state is a unique opportunity,
consistent with rational expectations of the agents, for the successful transition as modelled in those studies.
Shimer (1997) or Boeri (2000b) may be referred to for the proof. Other possible trajectories are exploding
and would derail transition, as is shown by Aghion and Blanchard (1994) for an extension of their model
where ﬁrms are forward-looking.
In our model, formal and informal ﬁrms have so far been assumed to be not forward-looking (or capital
markets not perfect), so that the economy always converges to a stationary point. Also, for a single set
of parameters only one non-trivial steady state exis t s . T h em u l t i p l i c i t yd o e sn o ta r i s eb e c a u s ew ed on o t
introduce feedback mechanisms such as, for example, endogenous government budget constraints that create
externality eﬀects in such models as Aghion and Blanchard (1994), Boeri (2000b), etc. Such complications
would make functions α(·) or/and β (·) depend on the level of non-employment (or numbers of the employed
in either sector), and thus make linear solutions to conditions Jn = λ or/and Ji = λ + µ impossible. We
reﬂect on the consequences of introducing the government budget constraint, or other feedback mechanisms,
in our model in section 3.11.2.
However, leaving aside for the time being the questions of equilibrium uniqueness/stability and formation
of expectations, we would like to stress that the three types of steady states discussed in the previous section
are qualitatively diﬀerent. That is, diﬀerent combinations of parameters deﬁne steady states either with or
without the new or informal sector. So, the qualitative result of transition can be very diﬀerent depending
on the government policies even when derailment of transformation (i.e. non-existence of steady states) is
excluded as a possibility.
253.8.2 Reaching the apex: transition trajectories
Now that we know where our economy is likely to end up, we address two more questions, namely: 1) What
does the development of new and informal sector look like before a steady state is reached? and 2) How does
t h ep r e s e n c eo ft h ei n f o r m a ls e c t o ra ﬀect the length of transition? The insights are provided below.
Assume for convenience that the set of parameters is chosen so that the economy converges to the steady
state where the new sector prevails in the end, i.e. condition (23) is satisﬁed. Other cases are easy to analyse
by analogy.
The shape of trajectories From (20) it follows that the old sector is exponentially decreasing till
its complete disappearance in the steady state. At the same time, the shape of trajectories followed by the
new and informal sectors depends, on the one hand, on the initial conditions and, on the other hand, on
the relative eﬀects on the job creation rates (10) and (11) both of the growth of non-employment and of a
change in sizes of the new and informal sectors.
The ﬁrst consideration follows from the fact that initial conditions at the onset of transition deﬁne the
relation between job creation functions Jn and Ji and job destruction rates λ and λ + µ. If, for example, at
the beginning Jn >λand/or Ji >λ+ µ either one or the other (or both) sectors can be increasing in size
for a while, regardless the type of the steady state the economy eventually converges to.
The second remark implies that the job creation rates vary as non-employment grows and levels of new






































Given the signs of the derivatives of Jn and Ji with respect to U, N,a n d ,I, in both equations above the
ﬁrst eﬀect is positive if dU
dt is positive, while the second and the third eﬀects are positive only if N or I are
decreasing. Thus, in principle, if the economy starts with, say Jn >λand Ji <λ+ µ, i.e. the new sector
grows, while the informal economy shrinks, the positive eﬀect of an increase in non-employment coupled
with a positive eﬀect of a decrease in the informal sector (that drives wages both in the new and the informal
sector down) can outweigh the negative eﬀect of the growth in the size of the new sector. Then Ji begins to
rise and as soon as it becomes greater than λ+µ, the informal economy can be growing too. This emphasises
two important aspects.
First, as non-employment is increasing in the rate of old sector closure, the rate of reduction in old sector
employment is a factor that has a bearing not only on the size of the new sector in transition as postulated
by the previous OST literature, but also on the size of its informal counterpart. In particular, the higher
that rate is, the more likely the informal economy will be growing in the process of reallocation of labour.
Hence, the more likely the participation in the formal economy decreases too.
Second, (28) and (29) indicate that it is the interplay between the new and informal sector development
that shapes the transition paths, but not only the development of non-employment alone. Appendix A
26examines in more detail the behaviour of the job creation rates in the neighbourhood of no-growth levels λ
and λ + µ. I nt h ee n d ,i tt u r n so u tt h a tas e to fp a r a m e t e r sd e ﬁning the resulting steady state is equally
responsible for the shape of trajectories.
Thus, to sum up our short discussion, the transitional development paths result from two factors. On the
one hand, the initial conditions do or do not give the impetus to the development of both new and informal
sectors. On the other hand, even if the initial conditions were not favourable it is the set of policy parameters
deﬁned by the knife-edge condition and the rate of reduction in old sector employment that ﬁnally conﬁgures
the path of the economy.
The eﬀect of the informal sector on the length of transition Suppose that model parameters
do not change so that steady state levels of new sector employment and non-employment are pre-deﬁned.
Then the timing of transition clearly depends on the presence of the informal sector. In Appendix A we
prove that the length of transition is shorter if the informal sector is absent, i.e. if the economy starts with
I (0) = 0.
If the economy starts oﬀ with some positive level of informal sector employment, then changes in pa-
rameters aﬀecting its size, but not inﬂuencing the resulting steady state, would also have an unambiguous
impact on the length of transition. For example, an increase in the level of monitoring µ does not aﬀect the
steady state level of new sector employment, N∗, and non-employment, U∗. However, it is easy to verify
that
∂Jn(U,N,I)
∂µ ≥ 0, while
∂Ji(U,N,I)
∂µ ≤ 0. Thus, by using an approach similar to the one employed to prove
t h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect of the presence of the informal sector, it is easy to show that a rise in µ speeds up the
transition, by eliminating the shadow economy faster.
All this clearly provides another illustration to the Caballero and Hammour (1996) argument that the
existence of informality slows down the adjustment process. The reasons for that in our model are the same
as the ones mentioned in the background section 2.2.2.
3.8.3 Notes on Dynamic Eﬃciency
Thus far, we have been silent on the welfare implications of parameter choices, pointing only to the possibility
of two qualitatively diﬀerent outcomes. However, changes in parameters also impact on the welfare of the
economy through their eﬀect on job creation functions that shape employment trajectories. Diﬀerent paths
taken by old, new, and informal sector employment and non-employment aﬀect the distribution of gains
during transition. For example, a choice of higher rate of closure of the old sector, γ, does not have any
eﬀect on the eventual outcome, but leads to a faster increase in non-employment. At the same time, as
mentioned above, this may also lead to an increase in the informal sector activity especially at the beginning
of transition, when the negative externality from the new sector is small. Meanwhile, an increase in the rate
of monitoring, µ, allows to eliminate the shadow sector faster (if the economy converges to a steady state
without informality). Either an increase in γ (or µ) may imply both gains and losses to the government.
Thus, on the one hand, the higher is the value of γ the higher is the maximum level of non-employment, which
apparently creates higher pressures on the government budget. On the other hand, more non-employment
implies lower wages, lower pressures on the new sector, and hence a higher level of job creation. There should
exist a value of γ, that balances these two eﬀects and makes the reallocation of labour dynamically optimal.
Burda (1993), Aghion and Blanchard (1994), Chadha and Coricelli (1994), Castanheira and Roland (2000)
27all study the eﬀects on the economy of too slow or too high a speed of transition. In the most recent work
on this topic Castanheira (2003) points to the diﬀerences in the optimal speed from the private and social
viewpoints.
In our setting the issue of ﬁnding an optimal speed of scale-down of old enterprises presents a serious
diﬃculty, because even within this simple model with three sectors the algebra becomes really involved.
However, on the basis of our results for the eﬀect of the informal sector on the length of transition, we can
argue that the optimal speed is not generally equal for the system with and without the informal sector.
This implies that if the government is to reform the economy without taking into the account the presence
of the shadow sector, it is likely to pursue at least not optimal set of policies.
In the next section we provide numerical simulations of our model to illustrate the issues we have been
discussing and to see how well it corresponds to the stylised facts.
3.9 Simulations
As we have seen in the preceding sections a choice of policy parameters determines the steady state where
the economy eventually converges in the end of transition. However, it is the development of the economy
before the steady state is reached which is of great interest. It is this dynamics that is normally compared
to the stylised facts and paths exhibited by economies in reality. Although we have provided some insights
into the shapes of trajectories, now we illustrate the dynamics by numerically simulating our simple model
for two sets of parameters. Simulations were run in GiveWin 2.10, using Ox for programming a fourth order
Runge-Kutta algorithm for numerical solution of the dynamic system of ordinary diﬀerential equations (20).
3.9.1 Choosing parameters
W es i m p l i f yb yl e t t i n gα and β be constant, and putting β =1−α. In section 3.7 α(·) and β (·) are deﬁned
as functions that capture the eﬀect of institutions and regulations on j o bc r e a t i o ni nt h en e wa n di n f o r m a l
sectors. Here we assume that these eﬀects are constant, and that by functioning in the shadow informal
ﬁrms lose access to some boons available to new formal ﬁrms and reﬂe c t e di nt h el e v e lo fα. Then, if the
total burden of regulations is measured from 0 to 1, and is equal to 1 − α, new formal ﬁrms can enjoy only
share α of their proﬁts. At the same time, informal ﬁrms save β =1−α, but give up share α of their proﬁts.
Having done that, the basic set of parameters is chosen as wo =1 ;y =2 ;bu =0 .5; c =1 ;m =1 ;r =0 .1;
λ =0 .1.
The wage/product per worker in the old sector, wo, is normalised to 1 for convenience. Workers in
new/informal ﬁrms are seen as twice as productive, y =2 , which is the level of diﬀerential in private/state
marginal products of labour chosen by Brixiova (1997). The level of unemployment beneﬁts is taken as 50%
of the old sector wage. This could seem to be a high value. For example, Boeri (1999) in the context of his
model treats the value of beneﬁt replacing 35% of the wage earned in old sector as already very high. This
value does, however, look plausible for, e.g., the Russian experience, where state enterprises are notable for
a very low level of wages. Also in our model, as labour is reallocated in the process of transition to new
or informal ﬁrms, paying a higher wage than the old sector, the ratio of beneﬁts to the average wage will
become smaller. For example, if we assume that workers in the new sector receive their product of labour,
equal to 2, and assign equal weights to wages in the old and the new sectors then the average wage will be
281.5. Then, unemployment beneﬁts replace the third of the average oﬃcial wage - a ﬁgure consistent with the
ratio of the average unemployment beneﬁt to the average wage reported by Rutkowski (1999) for Russia.
The mark-up values c and m are taken to be equal to 1 across the new and informal sectors. These
values reﬂect the degree of ineﬃciency in market relationships between a ﬁrm and a worker (Caballero and
Hammour, 1996) and are simply chosen as 50% of the maximum potential investment y t h a tc a nb eh e l du p
in the absence of any other costs. The choice serves well our purpose in giving an illustrative example.
Finally, we put the interest rate, r, to be equal to 10%, and the rate of economy-wide job destruction,
λ, to 10%. Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) report that in most western economies roughly 1 in 10 jobs is
destroyed every year.
What is left is to deﬁne the values of parameters γ, µ, and α. Here we consider two scenarios. The ﬁrst
is broadly deﬁned as a "lagging reformer", supposedly reﬂecting the experience of such countries as Russia
or Ukraine, with the rate of old sector job destruction, γ, not greater than the economy-wide shock, λ (i.e.
it is implicitly assumed that the jobs in the old sector may be maintained due to subsidies or soft budget
constraints), slack monitoring of the informal sector, and the legal and economic environment not friendly
to the development of the new sector (α is low). The second scenario is called an "advanced reformer",
purportedly mirroring the Polish or Estonian cases, with rate γ greater than the economy-wide shock, λ,
tighter monitoring of the informal economy and improved conditions on the legal, institutional, ﬁnancial,
etc. front (α is high).
For the lagging reformer we put γ =0 .06 (a ﬁgure obtained by Richter and Schaﬀer, 1996, for Russian
state-owned enterprises), µ =0(i.e. informal ﬁrms are destroyed as often as in the rest of the economy), and
α =0 .35 (i.e. β =0 .65). Assuming that α =1implies an economy free of corruption and where regulations
are not much of a burden to the new sector, the value of 0.35 seems reasonable for such countries as Russia
or Ukraine. Similar ﬁgures can be obtained by re-scaling to [0,1] various indices of the legal and regulatory
environment reported in EBRD (1999) and Johnson et al. (2000b) for the two countries.
The advanced reformer in our exercise has γ =0 .15, µ =0 .05 and α =0 .7 (β =0 .3). The ﬁgure for
the rate of job destruction is consistent with the one reported for the early 90s in Estonia by Haltiwanger
and Vodopivec (2002). With µ =0 .05 the cumulative rate of job destruction in the informal sector is 0.15,
which is one and a half times greater than the similar rate for the lagging reformer scenario. If µ is seen
as a direct result of monitoring by the tax police, then its value reﬂects tax police eﬃciency. EBRD (1999)
reports that the eﬃciency of tax collection was roughly 1.5 times greater in Poland and Estonia than in
Russia in the mid 90s. Finally, according to the value of α for this scenario it is twice as high as the one for
the lagging reformer. This is again broadly consistent with indices reported in EBRD (1999) and Johnson
et al. (2000b)15 for, on the one hand, Poland or Estonia, and, on the other hand, Russia or Ukraine.
Before seeing the results of simulations we need to assign initial values to stocks of workers in each of the
labour market states. For both scenarios we put O(0) = 0.9,N(0) = I (0) = 0.045 and U (0) = 0.01. This
implies that at the beginning of transition 90% of workers are employed in the old sector, new and informal
sector employment is small and comparable in size, and non-employment is about 1% of the labour force
(this is taken from Gregory and Collier, 1988, who estimate unemployment in the Soviet Union).
The output of simulations for the two set of parameters is presented in Fig.2 and 3.
15In Johnson et al. (2000b), for example, see also the data on time that managers of start-ups spend on government and
regulatory matters in Poland, Russia and Ukraine.
293.9.2 Correspondence to stylised facts
Fig.2 displays the case of the lagging reformer, with the new sector starting oﬀ well but then being crowded
out by the informal sector. In the meantime, the growth of the former is sustainable. The formal output
exhibits a L-type dynamics, while the total output follows a J-type trajectory. Such a type of dynamics
characterises the situation when condition (26) applies, i.e. the burden of regulations, etc. on the informal
ﬁrms is lighter than that on the new sector ﬁrms.
The case of the advanced reformer is given in Fig.3. The contrast is obvious: the new sector quickly gains
speed, while the informal sector is declining after a short period of prominence. Both formal output and
total output in the economy follow a J-type trajectory: a decline is followed by growth. These trajectories
result from a combination of parameters satisfying condition (23).
It is interesting that in both cases the informal sector grows at the beginning of transition. This, as
we suggested in section 3.8.2 above, is explained by the favourable initial conditions and the rise in non-
employment, whose eﬀect for some time outweighs the negative externality from the growing new sector,
which is small at start. However, in the ﬁrst case the rise in informality is sustained, while in the second case
worker participation in the formal economy recovers after a while. In both cases non-employment follows an
inverted L-type trajectory, reaching some peak in the midst of transition, decreasing somewhat afterwards
and stabilising at a non-zero level eventually.
In general, Fig.2 and 3 correspond to all the main stylised facts about employment and output dynamics
in transitional countries: old sector employment declines, new sector employment grows, the non-employment
path resembles an inverted L-curve. An increase in informal activity at the beginning of transition in both
cases may be seen as consistent with the evidence that participation in the labour force has lowered not
only in Russia or Ukraine, where the informal sector is believed to be notoriously big, but also in the East
European transition countries.
In the background section we have mentioned that as a rule the OST studies cannot explain the falling
new/old sector wage diﬀerentials and declining transition probabilities from unemployment. Fig.4 illustrates
that our model can generate dynamics in accordance with these stylised facts too (the set of parameters is the
one for the advanced reformer). Top panel shows that even for the advanced reformer average wages slightly
decline at the start of transition, but quickly regain their pre-transition level afterwards. At the same time
the probability of movement out of non-employment to the new sector declines as the economy converges
to the steady state. As this happens, the pool of non-employed becomes more stagnant, for the duration
of non-employment is decreasing in probabilities of exit. Thus, the growing stagnancy of non-employment
pools across all the transition countries can be a natural feature as their economies get closer to the steady
state.
As regards the stylised facts on the diﬀerence in CEEC and CIS transitional experience, in our view the
two cases presented above are telling. Broadly speaking, the ﬁrst type of dynamics considered is consistent
with fortunes of such countries as Russia or Ukraine. The second type of dynamics is more ﬁtting for Czech,
Slovak, Hungarian, Polish, or Estonian transition. Fig.5 and 6 illustrate the development of informal sectors
in the two categories of countries in the ﬁrst half of the 90s. More recent data are available in Feige and
Urban (2003, Fig.A1-A4), which pertain to the share of unrecorded income in transitional countries. Fig.2
and 3 (bottom right panel) give the dynamics of the share in our model, which is generally consistent with
dynamic tendencies estimated by Feige and Urban (2003) for the two groups of countries.
30Finally, Fig.2 clearly shows the diﬀerence in the dynamics of formal and total output in a country, the
lagging reformer. This may be seen as supporting the point often made in the literature: the decline of
output in Russia may in fact have been overestimated - if one takes into account the growing informal
economy, the degree of the decline is much lower (see, for example, Stiglitz, 2002, p.152, who also points to
the controversy over the GDP decline in Russia).16
3.10 Further Discussion and Policy Implications
Obviously, there are stylised facts that our model cannot explain. For example, a drop in real wages in the
old sector, or a drop in total labour productivity observed both in Russia and CEEC. However, its main
purpose is to account for evolution of the informal sector in transition and its eﬀect on the emerging new
sector. The main message it provides is that the asymmetries in the development of the CIS and CEEC may
well be sought in the diﬀerent degree of presence of the informal economy as well as the policies towards the
new emerging sector.
The model does identify the parameters that tune up the economy for convergence either to a "good"
equilibrium, where the new sector is present in the end of transition, or to a "bad" equilibrium where the
informal sector crowns the system. Interestingly, the speed of old sector closure, γ,i nt h es e t t i n gw eh a v e
considered (without embedded ﬁscal externalities) does not aﬀect the eventual outcome of transformation,
although should have a bearing on distribution of gains. In general, from condition (27) and the subsequent
analysis of the eﬀects of changes in parameters, it follows that the higher the ratio of α to β, the lower the
mark up c in relation to m (or, more generally, the bigger is the diﬀerence between the new and informal
sector surpluses, Sn−Si) the more chances the economy has to end up in a "good" equilibrium. This has an
unequivocal implication that the governments in transition should create a favourable climate for the new
sector to develop, if the transformation is to be successful. This seems to be more important than a choice
of a right speed of transition - the topic in the very centre of the OST debate.
The parameters α, β, c and m in our model reﬂect institutional features of the economy and ineﬃciencies
in the new and informal sectors arising from speciﬁc investment. They impact on the development of the
emerging sectors by aﬀecting job creation through the amount of ﬁrms’ proﬁts available for investing. So,
to ensure that the new sector takes oﬀ and thrives to succeed in transition the government must address the
institutional ills. Such an implication is very much in line with earlier arguments of Caballero and Hammour
(1996). In particular in respect of the aforementioned hold-up problem they write: "When appropriability
problems cannot be overcome at the microeconomic level, they receive a highly ineﬃcient macroeconomic
"solution" in the form of depressed investment and thus more diﬃcult employment opportunities for workers.
By restraining the bargaining position of workers in their transactions with ﬁrms, this endogenous response
allows the economic system to guarantee the required return on investment." In our model a reduced bar-
gaining power of workers in the new sector implies a lower mark-up c, which raises the odds that new ﬁrms
succeed. Similarly, if c reﬂects ﬁrms’ investment that is held up because of regulations (e.g. redundancy
pay), the reduction in the burden of such regulations should provide an additional incentive for the new
sector ﬁrms.
16We do not provide here the results of simulations for the intermediate case with both new and informal sectors present in
the steady state, which happens whenever condition (27) is met. However, the dynamics observed for such sets of parameters
is very similar to the case of the lagging reformer where the informal economy prevails in the end: the economy exhibits a
non-recovering drop in formal activity, while the evolution of formal output resembles L-curve.
31In general, our result that unfavourable institutions stiﬂe successful growth during adjustment periods
resembles ﬁndings of a few previous work. On the one hand, it echoes what Caballero and Hammour (1996,
2000a,b) call "sclerosis" - the ineﬃcient survival of low-productivity jobs. In this paper we show that poor
institutions lead to the development of the informal economy at the expense of the formal one, although the
productivity of both are equal. However, it is not diﬃcult to think of a less productive informal sector in
our context too, as what matters for the conclusions is not the level of productivity but the size of surpluses
in the new and informal sector (see section 3.8.1). On the other hand, our model suggests that the higher
is the surplus in the new sector (i.e. the lower various costs and ineﬃciencies facing it), the more intense
is the "entry" of new sector jobs and the more likely the transition turns out to be successful. This may
be seen as a complement to the result of Berkowitz and Cooper (1997): in their model decreasing the cost
discrimination against the entrant makes it more likely that the economy eventually converges to a high
development equilibrium, i.e. the equilibrium where de novo ﬁrms supply high quality goods, as opposed to
the low development equilibrium, in which start-ups provide lower quality goods and the overall supply of
goods is lower. The parallels between these two types of steady states and our "good" and "bad" outcomes
are clear. Still, however, despite these similarities the distinct feature of our model is the explicit development
of the informal economy.
Finally, once a favourable to the new sector set of parameters is chosen, the government can think of ways
to speed up the transition. Above we have shown that the presence of the informal sector in fact prolongs
the convergence to a "good" equilibrium. So, the eﬀorts may be taken to ward it oﬀ faster by increasing
monitoring of ﬁrms, µ, or punishment measures, F, for tax evasion at the start of transition, when the rise
in non-employment makes it more likely that the informal sector grows. At the same time, taxes should
be reduced to attract more entrepreneurs in the new sector. As soon as the economy is over the hump in
informal sector development the taxes on formal ﬁrms could be raised, provided that they still are held at
such a level that does not switch the economy towards a "bad" equilibrium. In general, what is important
for the new sector development is not the burden created by taxes or other factors per se, but their eﬀect in
comparison to the burden on the informal sector. Thus, it is likely that the government has enough ﬂexibility
to achieve a desirable outcome of transition.
3.11 Departures from Basic Model
The model we have been considering so far is in fact very basic and lacks a few useful features that can
make it more realistic. Here we brieﬂy discuss two such complications: forward-looking ﬁrms in the new and
informal sectors, and feedback mechanisms introducing externality eﬀects.
3.11.1 Forward looking ﬁrms
From (4) it is obvious that workers in our model are forward looking. This is, however, not true of the ﬁrms
in the new and informal sectors. Expressions (10) and (11) indicate that all of current proﬁts per worker,
corrected only for reactivity coeﬃcients α and β, are myopically invested by ﬁrms. However, Aghion and
Blanchard (1994) notice that job creation is likely to be at least in part forward-looking. They emphasise
that many new formally established ﬁrms, and especially foreign direct investors in transitional countries,
will not invest if they expect conditions to worsen and proﬁts to get lower in the future. One should expect
32that similar reasoning can be applied to the newly established ﬁrms in the informal economy too.
To patch our model up to take account of expectations on ﬁrms’ side we can modify the expressions (10)
and (11) for job creation per worker to read:









Then total job creation in the new sector will be rJnN, while in the informal economy it will equal rJiI.
So, instead of investing the current proﬁts into new job creation, ﬁrms invest the present value of their
proﬁts. Here we implicitly relax the assumption of capital market constraints.
In the so modiﬁed model the expressions for wages (7) and (8) stay the same, while the transition
probabilities are now re-deﬁned as pn = rJnN
U and pi = rJiI
U . Substituting the expressions for wages into the























Together with four diﬀerential equations (20) they determine dynamics of our economy. The same as
before three types of steady states of this system are deﬁned by the conditions: 1) O∗ =0 ,r J n = λ while
rJi <λ+ µ and I∗ =0(when only the new sector is present); 2) O∗ =0 ,r J i = λ + µ, while rJn <λand
N∗ =0(when only the informal sector is present); 3) O∗ =0 ,r J n = λ, rJi = λ + µ (when both the new
and informal sectors are present). It is easy to show that in steady states:
rJn = α
µ
USn − βmI(Si − Sn)






USi − αcN (Sn − Si)
(U + αcN + βmI)
¶
, (35)
which are essentially the same expressions as in (14) and (15). Thus, the conditions for the steady states are
the same as in the case of myopic ﬁrms.
The introduction of forward looking job creation aﬀects only paths leading to an equilibrium point, but
not the steady states themselves. Aghion and Blanchard (1994) show that convergence to a steady state will
in such case depend not only on the initial levels of non-employment and employment in sectors, but also
on the initial level of investment into new job creation. In such a situation expectations matter a lot and
they become self-fulﬁlling: if job creation is low at the beginning of transition the steady state may never
be reached.
333.11.2 Feedback mechanisms and multiple equilibria
Leaving aside the forward-looking ﬁrms, we move on to another important departure from our basic model.
This would be an introduction of ﬁscal or other types of externalities leading to multiple equilibria for each
set of parameters. Algebraically, it would imply that functions α(τ,ζ) or/and β (µ,F,ξ) in addition to policy
parameters such as τ, µ, F, also depend on stocks of workers N, U, I. This may happen if, for example,
the government always runs a balanced budget such that τJnN = buU. An alternative feedback mechanism
c a nb ea tw o r kw h e nt h ee ﬀectiveness of monitoring of the informal sector directly depends on the funds
available in the state budget, i.e., generally speaking, amount of taxes collected: µ = τJnN.
In such cases the above expressions for wn,w i,J n, and Ji become very complicated. The signs of their
derivatives with respect to U (or/and N and I) become ambiguous as a result of additional externality eﬀects
brought in. Then solutions to the conditions Jn = λ or/and Ji = λ+µ could well no longer be unique. The
number of possible steady states of the dynamic system could well increase. So, the problem of choosing a
correct combination of policy parameters becomes more involved. In particular, one should expect that the
choice of speed of the old sector closure, γ, is no longer neutral with respect to the eventual outcome: through
the eﬀect on the size of non-employment it would have a direct bearing on the convergence properties of the
system.
4C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this work we provided an extensive review of the literature taking up the issue of ﬁnding the Optimal
Speed of Transition. In our critical comments we highlight that the obvious weak spot of these studies is
their ignorance about informal sector employment widely observed in transitional countries. On the policy
front, they excessively focus on proper engineering of the job destruction in the old ineﬃcient sector, and
a reasonable choice of social support programmes (unemployment beneﬁts, wage ﬂoors, etc.). The job
creation part of the transition process and policies towards the emerging new sector have received hardly
any attention in the theory. The major failure of this literature, pretending to provide a theoretical model
of transition, is the inability to explain convincingly the noticeable diﬀerences in the development of East
European countries, on the one hand, and the countries of the Former Soviet Union (apart from the Baltic
states), on the other hand.
In our attempt to close the gap, we have presented a model of transition in the presence of the informal
sector, where qualitatively diﬀerent outcomes of transformation depend on the choice of various parameters,
many of which can be aﬀected by the government. In particular, we have showed that transition can fail if
the pressure of various factors on new formal ﬁrms outweighs the pressure on the informal sector. In such
a case it is the informal ﬁrms that dominate the post-transition economy. We argue that the convergence
to qualitatively diﬀerent equilibria helps explain the varying experience of CEE and CIS countries. This
point should be seen as complementing rather than substituting the previous attempts to explain the CEE
and CIS divide made by Garibaldi and Brixiova (1998) and Boeri and Terrell (2002), who argue that it is
the diﬀerences in unemployment beneﬁts, minimum wages and other labour market institutions that have
contributed to the divergence in question.
In general, our model highlights three main aspects theoretically vitally important in shaping the tran-
sition outcome.
34First, we support in the main the point made earlier by many other researchers that creation of institutions
favourable to the development of the new sector should be the paramount objective of transition. While the
speed of transition - the darling of many previous OST studies - does make the diﬀerence for the distribution
of gains, it may not be at all important for the qualitative result, as our model shows. At the same time, the
burden of taxes, labour market regulations and legal infrastructure, etc., captured by "reactivity coeﬃcients"
measuring friendliness of the economic environment towards particular sectors, deﬁnes the proportion of
proﬁts directed to investment purposes and the rate of job creation.17 What is interesting, however, is that
the model suggests that it is not, for instance, the high taxes per se that may be blamed for snarling up the
successful development of the new sector, but rather the burden they create on new ﬁrms in comparison to
the burden on their informal counterparts.
Second and getting more speciﬁc, we argue that it is the labour market conditions in the formal and
informal sectors that make the diﬀerence. In particular, we consider the mark-ups that new formal and
informal ﬁrms pay their workers over the value of being non-employed. As discussed in the text these mark-
ups can be given a host of explanations, but we suggest to see them as resulting from the appropriability
problem raised in the developing economics context by Caballero and Hammour (1996, 2000a,b). Reducing
the opportunities for investment hold-ups in the new sector in comparison with the informal sector is one of
the policy implications of the model for successful transition.
Finally, the presence of the informal sector undoubtedly prolongs the timing of transition. However, the
upsurge in non-employment at the start of transition as well as the initial conditions can lead to an increase
in the size of the shadow economy, regardless of the type of steady state the economy eventually converges
to. Thus, eﬀo r t sc o u l db em a d et or e d u c et h ee x t e n to fi n f o r m ality as quickly as possible provided that in
general the economic environment is favourable to the development of the new formal sector. It is suggested
that such a reduction can be achieved, for example, through more eﬃcient monitoring of informal activities
that would aﬀect the rate of death of informal ﬁrms. This has a direct impact on the labour turnover in the
sector and, thus, development of informality. By increasing monitoring eﬃciency, leading to higher incidence
of detection of informal activities, and their liquidation, the authorities can hinder the take-oﬀ of the informal
economy and ensure the success of transformation.
All in all, the main message of our model is that costs and the eventual success of transformation are
determined not only by the speed of restructuring of the old sector, but also, importantly, the policies towards
emerging new businesses. If such policies are highly regulatory and restrictive especially in comparison to
the policies towards the notorious informal economy, it is the latter not the formal new ﬁrms that prevail in
the economy eventually.
More generally, the model presented here supports the point recently made by Stiglitz (2002, p.57) that
"privatization needs to be part of a more comprehensive program, which entails creating jobs in tandem
with the inevitable job destruction that privatization often entails."
17EBRD (2000) reports that in CEE setting up a business was not unusual even before the transition, whereas in other
countries - Ukraine, e.g., - it was discouraged by a punitive use of taxation and other measures.
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A New and Informal Sector Mark-ups:
Cost of Separation Interpretation
Consider new sector ﬁrms and non-employed workers. The values of working in the new sector, Vn,a n do f
being non-employed, Vu, are given in (1) and (3). In the main text we do not explicitly consider the values
of an open vacancy and of a ﬁlled job to the ﬁrm. Let us denote these by Vv and Vj, respectively. Then the
total surplus of a match is given by S = Vn−Vu+Vj −Vv. The generalised Nash bargaining solution implies
that the wage is chosen so as to split the surplus as Vn − Vu =  S and Vj − Vv =( 1−  )S, where   is seen
as a parameter reﬂecting impatience of the two sides, or bargaining power of workers.
Under the assumption of no matching problem for ﬁrms the surplus of having a job ﬁlled rather than
vacant is equal to zero (Blanchard, 1998). That is if worker leaves or is ﬁred another one can be hired on the
spot. Then whatever is the bargaining power of workers, they are eﬀectively held down to their reservation
value while haggling over the wage: Vn−Vu =0 . However, suppose that separation implies a cost to the ﬁrm.
This may be interpreted as initial training (lasting one instant) that employer provides the worker with at
some cost k, or a state imposed redundancy cost. In both cases, it is supposed that worker can renegotiate
after being oﬃcially hired. In this case, the cost to the ﬁrm of separating and hiring another worker is k,
which is independent of labour market conditions because of the no matching problem assumption (ibid.).
Then Nash bargaining implies:
Vj − Vv =( 1−  )S = k
and
Vn − Vu =  S =
 k
(1 −  )
.
T h u s ,a sw ec a ns e ef r o mt h et w oe q u a t i o n sa b o v e ,c o n s t a n tc, deﬁned in the main text as equal to
Vn − Vu, depends on the value of separation costs in the new sector and the relative bargaining power of
workers and ﬁrms: c =  k
(1− ).
Similarly, for the informal sector constant m, equal to Vi − Vu, depends on the value of separation costs
in the informal sector and the relative bargaining of workers in the informal economy.
40A Derivation of Basic Results
A.1 Wages and Job Creation in the New and Informal Sectors














Job creation rates per worker employed in the new and informal sectors are, respectively:












where Sn =( y − bu − (r + λ)c),S i =( y − bu − (r + λ + µ)m),α≡ α(·) and β ≡ β (·).
The necessary condition for both sectors to exist is that both Jn (U,N,I) and Ji (U,N,I) are positive.
Otherwise, sector proﬁts are negative, as by assumption both α ≡ α(·) and β ≡ β (·) belong to [0,1].
























































(as Ji (U,N,I) ≥ 0)



















































(as Ji (U,N,I) ≥ 0)
A.2 Steady States
A.2.1 Only the new sector is present
Conditions for this steady state are Jn = λ, while Ji < (λ + µ) and I∗ =0 ,O ∗ =0 .














The necessary and suﬃcient condition for N∗ and U∗ to be positive in the steady state is αSn >λ .
The existence condition






|ss < (λ + µ)










¶ and then α>
λβ
((λ+µ)+β(Sn−Si)).
So, this steady state exists whenever α>
λβ
((λ+µ)+β(Sn−Si)).
The eﬀect of parameter changes





































A.2.2 Only the informal sector is present
Conditions for this steady state are Ji =( λ + µ), while Jn <λand N∗ =0 ,O ∗ =0 .















42The necessary and suﬃcient condition for I∗ and U∗ to be positive in the steady state is βSi > (λ + µ).
The existence condition





|ss <λ ,from which it follows that the steady






The eﬀect of parameter changes




































=( λ + µ)β
β(y−bu)−(λ+µ)
(βSi−(λ+µ)+(λ+µ)βm) > 0 (if the necessary and suﬃcient
condition for U∗ to be positive maintains in this steady state).
A.2.3 Both new and informal sectors are present
The conditions for this steady state to take place are Jn = λ and Ji =( λ + µ), while O∗ =0 . The conditions













=( λ + µ),
where U∗ =1− N∗ − I∗.
The existence condition
































+ α(Sn − Si)=α
βJi + α(Sn − Si).
So, if in the steady state Ji =( λ + µ) then α
β (λ + µ)+α(Sn − Si)=λ.
This last equality implies that the steady state exists whenever α =
βλ
((λ+µ)+β(Sn−Si)) - the knife-edge
condition (27) in the main text.
Multiplicity of equilibria When the knife-edge condition holds it is possible to show that the equilibria
are linked by the relation:
N∗ =
(βSi−(λ+µ))
(βSi−(λ+µ)+βcλ) − I∗ (βSi−(λ+µ)+βm(λ+µ))
(βSi−(λ+µ)+βcλ) .
The concrete size of the formal and informal sectors in such an equilibrium depends on initial conditions
as well as various combinations of policy parameters.
Indeed, in equilibrium
N∗ =e x p
³R t∗
0 (Jn − λ)dt
´
N (0), and I∗ =e x p
³R t∗
0 (Ji − λ − µ)dt
´
I (0),
43where t∗ is time necessary to reach the steady state. It is also possible to show that the condition (27)
implies (Jn − λ)=α
β (Ji − (λ + µ)).





0 (Ji − (λ + µ))dt
´
N (0), so that N∗









First, as we can see from the factor before the integral in the expression above, the relative size of N∗ and
I∗ depends on the ratio of α(·) and β (·), even if the integral is the same for various sets of policy parameters
satisfying the knife-edge condition, and if N (0) = I (0). That is, by changing r, c, m, λ, µ, α(·) and β (·) so
that the condition (27) holds, the value of N∗
I∗ depends, ceteris paribus,o nt h er a t i oo fα(·) and β (·). So,
for any set of initial conditions the knife-edge equilibrium is not generally unique.
Second, the value of the integral in turn depends on the initial conditions, namely U (0),N(0) and I (0),
in addition to the values of r, c, m, λ, µ, α(·), and β (·), through job creation function Ji (U,N,I). Thus,
for each knife-edge condition the corresponding steady state is not generally unique either, and depends on
the initial conditions.
From the multiplicity of equilibria it follows that we clearly have a coordination problem in this case:
under the restriction that α =
βλ
((λ+µ)+β(Sf−Si)) the government can still aﬀect the relative level of infor-
mal employment and achieve various levels of welfare by changing correspondence between parameters, in
particular α(·) and β (·).
The eﬀect of parameter changes
Obviously, whenever the knife-edge condition is violated we immediately end up in one of the two cases
considered above - the system start converging to another steady state equilibrium. This implies that these
steady states are very sensitive to parameter changes.











The sign of this expression is ambiguous, unless one makes an additional ad hoc assumption regarding the
relative value of m and c.H o w e v e r , b y a s s u m p t i o n β<1 so that the second term in the numerator is
likely to be very low. Then it is likely that an increase in λ leads to an increase in the right hand side of
the knife-edge condition, thus putting the economy in the situation when it converges to the steady state
without the new sector.
A Behaviour of job creation functions
In this appendix we pay some more attention to the behaviour of job creation rates in the neighbourhood
of no-growth points Jn (U,N,I)=λ and Ji (U,N,I)=λ + µ. This provides some insight into the shape of
trajectories as the economy converges to a steady state.
A b o v ew eh a v es h o w nt h a t
Jn (U,N,I)=α
βJi (U,N,I)+α(Sn − Si),
where Sn and Si are the surpluses in the new and informal sectors respectively.






Consider the case when the policy parameters are favourable to the steady state with the new sector




It can readily be shown that under this condition we have
Jn − λ>α
β (Ji − (λ + µ)).
In other words, whenever the informal sector is growing, i.e. Ji > (λ + µ), the new sector is growing too,
while whenever the new sector is declining, Jn <λ , the informal economy is in recession as well. Assume
that from the start of transition both sectors are growing. We know that in the steady state Jn = λ.T h i s
means that the rates Jn and Ji must be decreasing. What happens to the size of the two sectors?
Let us denote by tn and ti the times necessary to achieve the point where the sector sizes start to decrease.
That is, if at time moment t0 we have Jn = J∗
n >λand Ji = J∗
i >λ+ µ, and Jn and Ji are decreasing, as
∂Jn
∂N < 0, ∂Jn
∂I < 0, ∂Ji
∂N < 0,a n d∂Jn
∂I < 0,i tt a k e stn and ti for the new and the informal sectors, respectively,










dt dt = J∗
i − λ − µ
respectively.









dt dt = α
βJ∗
i + α(Sn − Si) − λ. (∗)
From α
β > λ
(λ+µ)+β(Sn−Si) it follows that (λ + µ) >
β
αλ − β (Sn − Si),i . e .
J∗
i + β (Sn − Si) −
β
αλ>J ∗
i − λ − µ.
Thus, from (∗) and the second integral it follows that ti <t n.
This implies that even when initially both sectors grow, the informal sector is ﬁr s tt or e a c ht h ee d g ew h e n
it starts to decrease, while the new sector will still be growing until it gets into the steady state (meanwhile,
the informal sector must completely disappear as the steady state is reached). So, the shape of the trajectory
followed by the new sector resembles an inverted L-curve, while the path taken by the informal sector mimics
an inverted J-curve.
Now let us assume that the initial conditions are such that J∗
n <λand J∗
i <λ+ µ, i.e. both sectors




dt become positive, so that the decline in size of the new and informal sectors gets more moderate.
By applying a reasoning similar to the one above, it can be shown that the new sector is ﬁrst to achieve the
point where Jn >λand it could start growing, while the informal sector will still be shrinking.
Numerical simulations in section 3.9 provide an illustrative example of the dynamics of our economy.
AT h e E ﬀect of the Informal Sector
on the Length of Transition
I nt h em a i nt e x tw ea r g u et h a tt h ep r e s e n c eo ft h ei n f o rmal sector slows down the transition. To see this,
let us assume that a set of parameters is chosen so that the condition (23) favourable to the prevalence of
the new sector in the end is satisﬁed. The ﬁxed set of parameters deﬁnes the resulting steady state level of
new sector employment, N∗, and non-employment, U∗.
Let us consider two paths followed by new sector employment (see Fig.A1). The ﬁrst trajectory is given
by the solution Nn (t) to the system (20) with initial conditions O(0) = O0,N(0) = Nn (0) = N0,I(0) = 0,
45U (0) = U0. The second trajectory is given by the solution, Ni (t), to the dynamic system with initial
conditions O(0) = O0,N(0) = Ni (0) = N0 − ε, I (0) = ε, U (0) = U0, where ε is some inﬁnitesimally small
number. From continuity of function Jn (U,N,I) it follows that it is always possible to choose ε so that
Jn (U0,N 0,0) >J n (U0,N 0 − ε,ε). By putting ε → 0 one can prove that the new sector takes oﬀ faster in
the absence of the informal sector. Does it mean that it is the ﬁrst to arrive at N∗?
Let us denote the time Nn (t) arrives at steady state by Tn. Suppose now, that despite the fact that
initially Ni (t) grows slower than Nn (t), after some time it catches up and arrives at steady state N∗ at
some time Ti <T n. This implies that, as N0−ε<N 0, the path Ni (t) must cross the path Nn (t) from below
at least once. Suppose it happens at some moment of time tc.T h e nNn (tc)=Ni (tc)=N (tc), while the level
of old sector employment is O(tc) (it is the same for both sets of initial conditions, as development of the old
sector does not depend on N, U or I). Let Un (tc)=Un and Ui (tc)=Ui, be the levels of non-employment,
and In (tc)=0and Ii (tc)=Ii be the levels of shadow employment for the two sets of initial conditions
(note that the informal sector does not take oﬀ if In (0) = 0). From the consistency conditions evaluated at
tc we have that O(tc)+N (tc)+Un = O(tc)+N (tc)+Ui +Ii, or, equivalently Un = Ui +Ii. The fact that




∂I < 0 and Un >U i,I i > 0 we can conclude that Jn (Ui,N(tc),I i) <J n (Un,N(tc),0). The
contradiction proves that the path Nn (t) lies above the path Ni (t), and that Ti >T n, i.e. the new sector
reaches the steady state faster in the absence of the informal counterpart.
46B Figures














1.00 Old sector employment 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0.06
0.08
New sector employment 





0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0.25
0.50
0.75 Informal sector employment 




1.00 Formal Output 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
1.25
1.50
1.75 Total Output 




New/Old Wage Differential 




Share of Unrecorded Income 
Figure 2 Simulations. A case of the lagging reformer: the economy converges to the steady state without the
new sector
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Figure 3 Simulations. A case of the advanced reformer: the economy converges to the steady state without the
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Figure 4 Simulations. Behaviour of average wages and transition probabilities.

























































Figure 6 Informal sector in selected FSU countries (Source: Johnson et al., 1997)
Figure A1 Length of Transition 
 
DAVIDSON INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES - Most Recent Papers 
The entire Working Paper Series may be downloaded free of charge at: www.wdi.bus.umich.edu 
 
CURRENT AS OF  5/07/04 
Publication Authors  Date 
No. 689: Diverging Paths: Transition in the Presence of the Informal 
Sector 
Maxim Bouev  May 2004 
No. 688: What Causes Bank Asset Substitution in Kazakhstan? 
Explaining Currency Substitution in a Transition Economy 
Sharon Eicher  May 2004 
No. 687: Financial Sector Returns and Creditor Moral Hazard: Evidence 
from Indonesia, Korea and Thailand 
Ayse Y. Evrensel and Ali M. 
Kutan 
May 2004 
No. 686: Instability in Exchange Rates of the World Leading 
Currencies: Implications of a Spatial Competition Model 
Dirk Engelmann, Jan Hanousek 
and Evzen Kocenda 
May 2004 
No. 685: Corporate Spinoffs, Privatization, and Performance in 
Emerging Markets 
Jan Svejnar, Evzen Kocenda and 
Jan Hanousekf 
May 2004 
No. 684: CPI Bias and Real Living Standards in Russia During the 
Transition 
John Gibson, Steven Stillman and 
Trinh Le 
May 2004 
No. 683: Mission Implausible III: Measuring the Informal Sector in a 
Transition Economy using Macro Methods 
Jan Hanousek and Filip Palda  May 2004 
No. 682: The Other Side of the Moon: The Data Problem in Analyzing 
Growth Determinants 
Jan Hanousek, Dana Hajkova and 
Randall K. Filer 
May 2004 
No. 681: Consumers' Opinion of Inflation Bias Due to Quality 
Improvements 
Jan Hanousek and Randall K. 
Filer 
May 2004 
No. 680: IMF-Related Announcements, Fundamentals, and Creditor  
Moral Hazard: A Case Study of Indonesia 
Ayşe Y. Evrensel and Ali M. 
Kutan 
May 2004 
No. 679: Privatization Matters: Bank Efficiency in Transition Countries  John P. Bonin, Iftekhar Hasan and 
Paul Wachtel 
Apr. 2004 
No. 678: Does Market Liberalisation Reduce Gender Discrimination? 
Econometric Evidence from Hungary, 1986—1998 
Dean Jolliffe and Nauro F. 
Campos 
Apr. 2004 
No. 677: Governance and Performance of Microfinance Institutions in 
Central And Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States 
Valentina Hartarska  Apr. 2004 
No. 676: Equilibrium Exchange Rates in the Transition: The Tradable 
Price-Based Real Appreciation and Estimation Uncertainty 
Balázs Égert and Kirsten 
Lommatzsch 
Apr. 2004 
No. 675: Productivity growth and the real appreciation of the accession 
countries' currencies 
Kirsten Lommatzsch and Silke 
Tober 
Apr. 2004 
No. 674: Exchange Rate Policy and Inflation in Acceding Countries: 
The Role of Pass-through 
Fabrizio Coricelli, Boštjan Jazbec 
and Igor Masten 
Apr. 2004 
No. 673: Is Kazakhstan a Market Economy Yet?  Getting warmer….  Sharon Eicher  Apr. 2004 
No. 672: Financial Institutions and The Wealth of Nations: Tales of 
Development 
Jian Tong and Chenggang Xu  Apr. 2004 
No. 671: Interest Rate Pass-Through in EU Acceding Countries: The 
Case of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
Jesús Crespo Cuaresma, Balázs 
Égert, and Thomas Reininger 
Mar. 2004 
No. 670: A minimum of rivalry: evidence from transition economies on 
the importance of competition for innovation and growth 
Wendy Carlin, Mark Schaffer and 
Paul Seabright 
Mar. 2004 
No. 669: Dual Track Liberalization: With and Without Losers  Jiahua Che and Giovanni 
Facchini 
Mar. 2004 
No. 668: Enterprise Restructuring and Firm Performance: 
A Comparison of Rural and Urban Enterprises in Jiangsu Province 
Xiao-yuan Dong, Louis 
Putterman and Bulent Unel 
Mar. 2004 
No. 667: A Tale of Two Provinces: The Institutional Environment and 
Foreign Ownership in China 
Yasheng Huang and Wenhua Di  Mar. 2004 
No. 666: Ownership Characteristics and Access to Finance: 
Evidence from a Survey of Large Privatised Companies in Hungary 
and Poland 
Natalia Isachenkova and Tomasz 
Mickiewicz 
Mar. 2004 
No. 665: Testing Creditor Moral Hazard in Sovereign Bond Markets: 
A Unified Theoretical Approach and Empirical Evidence 
Ayşe Y. Evrensel and Ali M. 
Kutan 
Mar. 2004 
No. 664: Assessing Equilibrium Exchange Rates in CEE Acceding 
Countries: Can We Have DEER with BEER without FEER? 
Balázs Égert  Feb. 2004 
 